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We initiate a systematic study to provide upper bounds on device-independent key, secure against
a non-signaling adversary (NSDI), distilled by a wide class of operations, currently used in both
quantum and non-signaling device-independent protocols. These operations consist of a direct mea-
surements on the devices followed by Local Operations and Public Communication (MDLOPC). We
employ the idea of “squashing” on the secrecy monotones, which provide upper bounds on the key
rate in secret key agreement (SKA) scenario, and show that squashed secrecy monotones are the
upper bounds on NSDI key. As an important instance, an upper bound on NSDI key rate called
“squashed non-locality”, has been constructed. It exhibits several important properties, includ-
ing convexity, monotonicity, additivity on tensor products, and asymptotic continuity. Using this
bound, we identify numerically a domain of two binary inputs and two binary outputs non-local
devices for which the squashed non-locality is zero, and therefore one can not distill key from them
via MDLOPC operations. These are mixtures of Popescu-Rohrlich (PR) and anti-PR box with the
weight of PR box less than 80%. This example confirms the intuition that non-locality need not
imply secrecy in the non-signaling scenario. The approach is general, describing how to construct
other tighter yet possibly less computable upper bounds. Our technique for obtaining upper bounds
is based on the non-signaling analog of quantum purification: the complete extension. This exten-
sion provides the ultimate eavesdropping power with the minimal consumption of eavesdropper’s
memory and, as we prove, yields equivalent security conditions as previously known in the literature.
Introduction: Cryptographic key distribution is a process
of sharing secret key bits between two distant parties, in
the presence of an eavesdropper [1–3]. The entire crypto-
graphic protocols has been divided structurally into four
major security paradigms, namely secret key agreement
scenario (SKA) [1–4], device dependent security against
quantum adversary (QDD) [4–7], device independent se-
curity against quantum adversary (QDI) [5, 8–13] and
device independent security against non-signaling adver-
sary (NSDI) [14–17], see [3] for a review. In the SKA
scenario, the parties share marginals of a classical dis-
tribution P (ABE) respectively, and the honest parties
(usually Alice and Bob) can process their data by the
so-called Local Operations and Public Communication
(LOPC), while the eavesdropper Eve listens to the public
communication and can apply any stochastic map on her
data [1, 2].
The QDD scenario, originating conceptually from the
SKA, was introduced at the early stage of quantum cryp-
tography [4, 5]. In this paradigm, the three parties share
(in the worst case) a subsystem of a joined pure quan-
tum state |ΨABE〉. Alice and Bob can process this state
by Local quantum Operations and Classical Communi-
cation (LOCC), while Eve obtains any system which is
discarded by Alice and Bob (which is equivalent to lis-
tening) and can perform any quantum operation on her
share [18–20]. This scenario has a drawback that Alice
and Bob have to trust the inner working of their device:
the dimensionality of the state and operations of mea-
surement performed by the device. This problem has
been resolved in a much more sophisticated approach of
QDI, quantum device independent scenario, where honest
parties shared an untrusted device, described by a joint
conditional probability distribution P (AB|XY ). Secu-
rity has been ensured by estimating the non-local corre-
lation shared by them, by pressing the input X,Y and
output A,B of the device. Eavesdropper assumed to
be restricted by the laws of quantum mechanics, holds
purification of a state, via the inner working of the de-
vice (which is of her choice), generates these statistics
P (AB|XY ), for Alice and Bob. Additionally, it satisfies
the non-signaling condition, i.e., the marginals, are well
defined. Hence the distribution is called a non-signaling
device. The honest parties can process information by
pressing the inputs, generating data from the device, and
further performing the LOPC operations.
Non-signaling adversary scenario: Another important
branch of key distribution that has emerged in the
last two decades is the non-signaling device-independent
(NSDI) scenario [14–17, 21–24], where the eavesdropper
is restricted only by the non-signaling condition and the
honest parties can share possibly supra-quantum correla-
tion. The shared object is a tripartite non-signaling de-
vice, P (ABE|XY Z), with Z and E being the input and
output choices of the eavesdropper Eve. On this object,
the parties perform some measurements and post-process
their data by some LOPC operations, to produce the se-
cure key. Moreover, inside the device, there might be
so-called wirings (output-to-input connections) between
the subsystems. In particular, subsystems of one party
can signal to each other. Eve, can listen to the pub-
lic communication, and perform certain device-to-device
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2or device-to-distribution operations. The non-signaling
paradigm that allows to define the NSDI scenario be-
came an active field of research since the seminal papers
of Rastall [25], Khalfin and Tsirelson [26] as well as by
Popescu and Rohrlich [27].
The first NSDI protocol, whose security was proven,
was given by Barrett, Hardy and Kent [14]. The pro-
tocol results in a single key bit in the noiseless sce-
nario. Later, lower bounds on the key rate has been
derived in [16, 22, 23], via several key distillation pro-
tocols, under the assumption that eavesdropper attacks
each of the subsystems separately. In the presence of a
collective eavesdropping attack, it was shown in Refs.
[15, 17, 24], that one can obtain a non-zero key rate
if there is fully non-signaling constraint. By fully non-
signaling, we mean none of the subsystem can signal to
each other. If a single device has been used N times,
it can be assumed as a joint device of 2N sub-systems1,
each of the honest parties holds N subsystems, and any
set of k subsystems, where 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N , can not sig-
nal to the remaining 2N − k subsystems. The key rate
vanishes due to the fact that if the device can perform
signaling between its subsystems [28], then it is impossi-
ble to find any hash function for privacy amplification in
the presence of a non-signaling eavesdropper. Moreover,
if the device has a memory [29, 30], or can have forward
signaling [31], then a wide class of hash functions can be
attacked by a non-signaling Eve.
Motivation: In the NSDI scenario described above,
only the lower bounds on the key rate has been consid-
ered [14–17, 21–24], while the upper bounds remain un-
known. In contrast, if one considers the QDD scenario,
both lower bounds [18, 32], and upper bounds [32–34]
on the secure key rate are well known. Some of them
are based on the entanglement measure called “squashed
entanglement” [34]. A welcome feature of this measure
is that it is an additive function, i.e., one avoids regu-
larization like it is the case for the relative entropy of
entanglement [19, 20, 35]. We aim at both constructing
upper bounds in the NSDI scenario and introducing novel
measures of non-locality. Although the analog of relative
entropy - the “strength of non-locality proof” [36] (also
called relative entropy of non-locality [37]) has been con-
structed, no analog of squashed entanglement was known
in the realm of non-locality (for the parallel, and differ-
ent approach see [38]). In our approach to the problem,
we are guided by an analogy between entanglement and
non-locality.
Main results: In this manuscript, we construct upper
bounds on the NSDI key rate, distillable via (i) direct
measurement, changing device into a distribution fol-
1 In this paper, by “device” we mean a single-use device. A device
can be used by measuring its input. A single-use device can
not be measured more than once. If there is a need to perform
multiple measurements on a device, then then it will be assumed
as a composite device consists of multiple single-use devices.
lowed by (ii) Local Operations and Public Communica-
tion (denoted together as MDLOPC operations). Aim-
ing at upper bounds, we study the scenario in which
the shared device consists of N independent and iden-
tically distributed (iid) copies of a non-signaling device
P (AB|XY ). We define a wide class of secrecy quan-
tifiers taken from the so-called SKA (secure key agree-
ment) model [2]. One such quantifier we call the squashed
non-locality, as we define it in analogy to squashed en-
tanglement [34], however, in the realm of non-signaling
devices. We then show that the squashed non-locality
serves as an upper bound on the key distilled by MD-
LOPC operations. It is important to note that all the
secure key distillation protocols in QDI and NSDI, be-
longs to the MDLOPC class of operations. Therefore,
our bounds, on the amount of key, bound from above the
key rate achieved by a wide class of practical protocols.
Using the bound, we then obtain numerically a region
of non-local two binary input and two binary output,
(2, 2, 2, 2) devices, from which no key can be distilled via
MDLOPC operations. These are the “isotropic” mix-
tures of the devices, namely the Popescu-Rohrlich (PR)
box and the box complementarity to it, the anti-PR box,
when the admixture of the PR box is less than 80%.
We compare the upper bound via non-signaling squashed
non-locality for isotropic devices with the lower bound on
the key rate taken form [17] (see figure 2).
The squashed non-locality, as we prove, possesses many
properties of those desired for a measure of non-locality
such as convexity and additivity. It can also be useful in
the experimental perspective because, as we show, it is
asymptotically continuous. It means that the difference
between the non-signaling squashed non-localities of two
devices is proportional to their distance, where the pro-
portionality factor is only the log of dimension of the
devices. The generality of our approach stems from the
fact that we also provide a method of generating tighter
(though possibly harder to compute) upper bounds. In-
deed, in defining the squashed non-locality, we used the
secrecy monotone called intrinsic information. One can,
however, use some other monotone, e.g. the so-called
reduced intrinsic mutual information, which also leads
to an upper bound. Due to an analogy between entan-
glement and non-locality, the upper bounds we provide
here are also measures of non-locality, and as such, can
be studied independently.
We finally compare here the proposed security criteria
with the previously known security protocol [12, 17], and
formally prove their equivalence. In the case of quantum
mechanics, the power of eavesdropper is fully described
by the system of the honest parties through the so-called
purification. However, it is known that there is no ana-
log of the quantum purification in the realm of devices
[40, 41]. To overcome this problem, we have used a re-
cently introduced notion of complete extension [42], to
describe the eavesdropper’s power. The complete exten-
sion, E(P )(ABE|XY Z), of the shared device P (AB|XY )
is the worst-case extension that Eve can share with the
3FIG. 1: Summary of part of the results which contribute to
the analogy between security paradigms: SKA scenario where
distributions are processed, and one of the upper bounds is
the intrinsic information I(A : B ↓ E), QDD protocol, where
the shared pure state is processed, and distillable key KD
is upper bounded (among others) by the measure ”squashed
entanglement” Isq [39]. We reformulate NSDI paradigm so
that it bases on the complete extension, E(P (AB|XY ), of
a device (conditional distribution) P (AB|XY ), introduce an
analogue of intrinsic information and squashed entanglement
called ”squashed non-locality”.
honest parties. It is the worst case in the sense that it
gives the largest power to the eavesdropper as quantum
purification does in QDD and QDI scenarios. Indeed,
complete extension gives access to all possible ensembles
of the device of the honest parties, when randomizing
input and post-processing channel is applied on the ex-
tended part. It implies as we show in detail, that this
structural approach is equivalent to the one proposed in
[17]. To prove the equivalence between our criteria and
those proposed so far [12, 17], we have defined an oper-
ational distance measure between non-signaling devices,
the NS norm analogs to the trace norm in quantum me-
chanics (aka the one give in [43]) and obtained that our
definition of security is composable in a sense given in
[17]2. A visualization of some of these results that con-
tribute to develop a structural analogy between QDD and
NSDI are presented in figure 1.
Security definition in the IID scenario: In every DI se-
cure key distillation protocol, the honest parties perform
several number of test runs to estimate the non-local cor-
relation present in the system and a (larger) number of
key generation runs to generate the raw key. The raw
key is further processed to yield the final key only if the
device has passed the test run, i.e., the data are com-
patible with a sufficiently non-local device. Aiming at
2 Naturally however, the device can not be reused in composing
the protocols due to the threat of the memory attack [44]
upper bounds, we study only the performance of the key
generation runs. We, therefore, assumed that, on the N
iid copies of the shared device P (AB|XY ), the honest
parties perform full direct measurement3 MFx,y, by set-
ting X = x (Alice) and Y = y (Bob) at their choice,
followed by any composition of classical post-processing
of the distribution P (AB|xy), and public communica-
tion. Eve, on the other hand, can post-process her data,
represented by P˜ (E|Z,Q), after listening to the commu-
nication Q, between the honest parties. The possible
measurements by Eve could be the direct measurement
MFz , on her part of the input Z = z, or the general
one MGz′ =
∑
z p(z|z′)MFz , i.e., probabilistic choice of
the direct ones. Eve can perform the general measure-
ment MGz′ , by wiring the output of a dice, that generates
a random conditional probability distribution p(z|z′), to
the input of her part of the device.
Knowing the class of operations, we can specify what
the key distillation protocol is. A protocol of key distil-
lation is a sequence of MDLOPC operations Λ = {ΛN},
performed by the honest parties on N iid copies of the
shared devices. Each of these ΛN , consists of a measure-
ment stage {MN}, followed by post-processing {PN}, on
N iid copies of P (AB|XY ). Moreover, for each consec-
utive, complete extension of N copies of shared devices
E(P⊗N )(ABE|XY Z), the protocol outputs a probability
distribution in part of Alice and Bob and a device in part
of Eve, which is arbitrarily close to an ideal distribution,
satisfies
||ΛN
(E (P⊗N))− P (dN )ideal ||NS ≤ εN N→∞−→ 0. (1)
Here A = A1A2 . . . AN , B, X and Y are similarly de-
fined. The tensor product should be understood as a
“max” tensor product in RN space [45]. To measure the
closeness between two devices P and P ′, we use the newly
defined distance measure, the NS norm. It partially re-
sembles with the distance measure introduced in [43] for
conditional probability distribution, which amounts to
||P − P ′||NS = supO
1
2
||O(P )−O(P ′)||1 . (2)
Where O, is the set of all linear operations which map
a device to a probability distributions (for more de-
tailed discussion see Sec. III of the supplementary
material). After the MDLOPC key distribution pro-
tocol, the output of the honest parties reduces to a
classical-classical-probability distribution, whereas the
part shared by Eve still remains a device, of the
form ΛN
(E (P⊗N))
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z (sA, sB , q, E|Z), where
sA and sB are the instances of the key shared between Al-
ice and Bob. We will denote random variables SA, SB for
3 By setting to the input variable a value, which corresponds to
pressing a button on a device.
4the secret keys in possession of Alice and Bob, whereas Q
stands for all possible classical communications between
Alice and Bob; E, Z for Eve’s output and input (and
the lower case letters are for their values). This distri-
bution, which is in part of probability distribution and
a conditional distribution i.e., device will be denoted as
“classical classical-device” (cc-d) distribution throughout
the paper. The
(
P
(dN )
ideal
)
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z
(sA, sB , q, E|Z) =
δsA,sB
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
ΛN
(E (P⊗N)) (s′A, s′B , q, E|Z), is an ideal
cc-d distribution which contains uniform and perfectly
correlated outcomes shared between the honest parties.
Eve is completely uncorrelated for this distribution and
it is assumed that Eve’s system is exactly same as she
might possess at the end of the real protocol ΛN .
For the cc-d distribution shared at the end of the MD-
LOPC protocol, the NS norm given in Eq. (2) takes a
more simplified form, stated in the following Corollary:
Corollary 1. For the cc-d states shared at the end of the
MDLOPC protocol ΛN , the NS norm can be rephrased
with a simplified expression:∣∣∣∣PSA,SB ,Q,E|Z −QSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣NS =
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣PSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
−QSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
∣∣ , (3)
where maxz, stands for the maximization over all possible
direct measurements performed by the eavesdropper.
Proof. For the proof see Sec. III of the supplementary
material.
In our MDLOPC protocol of key distillation, we use the
application of the above Corollary when we write the
distance between the output of a real protocol and the
ideal protocol. This Corollary helps us to understand
how MDLOPC key distribution protocols used in this
paper cannot enhance the distinguishing probability from
the ideal one among the possible eavesdropping strategies
explained in Sec. II B of the supplementary material.
The definition of the secret key rate, based on the no-
tion of the complete extension and the key distillation
protocol satisfying the proximity in the NS norm accord-
ing to the Eq. (67), is provided below.
Definition 1. Given a bipartite device P ≡ P (AB|XY )
the secret key rate of the protocol of key distillation ΛN ,
on N iid copies of the device, denoted by R (Λ|P ) is a
number lim supN→∞
log dN
N , where log dN is the length of
a secret key shared between Alice and Bob, with dN =
dimA
(
ΛN
(E (P⊗N))) ≡ |SA|. The device independent
key rate of the iid scenario is given by
K
(iid)
DI (P ) = sup
Λ
R (Λ|P ) , (4)
where the supremum is taken over all MDLOPC protocols
{Λ}.
Later in this manuscript, we argue that the above
definition is equivalent in terms of security to the one
adopted earlier [12, 17] which allows us to compare some
of existing lower bounds with the upper bounds that we
provide.
Rephrasing the key rate of SKA model: In the SKA model
of key distillation, the honest parties and the eavesdrop-
per share a joint probability distribution P (ABE). The
task of the honest parties is to perform LOPC opera-
tion to distill a secret key, in such a manner that the
eavesdropper’s knowledge about the key remains negligi-
bly small. In the following lines, we propose an alterna-
tive definition of the key rate in the aforementioned sce-
nario and prove that it is equivalent to the definition of
the secret key rate introduced in the literature [1, 2, 34].
The aim of this rephrasing is to show and utilize a con-
nection between the definition of secret key rate in SKA
and NSDI scenarios, as it was done for the quantum case
[34].
Theorem 1. The secret key rate S(A : B||E) of SKA
cryptographic model can be expressed via the following
asymptotic formula:
S(A : B||E) = sup
P
lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N (ABE)))
N
,
(5)
where P are cryptographic protocols satisfying security
conditions of Maurer [2], as well as the proximity in norm
security criteria, for N iid copies of the probability dis-
tribution P (ABE) and P = {PN}, part of the MDLOPC
protocol.
Proof. For the proof see Sec. V. of the supplementary
material.
The link we have made, in the above Theorem, is cru-
cial for obtaining the upper bound on the key rate in
our NSDI key. Remember that the r.h.s of Eq. (5), is
the same as the key rate of MDLOPC key distillation
protocol Λ, given in Definition 1. The only difference is
that in our definition, we are dealing with the devices,
whereas Eq. (5), involves only probability distribution.
It is important to note that ΛN , acting on the CE of N
iid copies of the shared device P (AB|XY ), consists of
measurement stage {MN}, followed by post-processing
{PN}. The measurements connect the devices with the
distributions P (ABE) ≡ (M)P (ABE|XY Z)4, which is
one of the important steps in the procedure of squashing
secrecy monotones of SKA model. The secrecy mono-
tones, which provide upper bounds in the SKA model,
will undergo a squashing procedure, to provide the up-
per bounds, which is a subject to the next.
Squashing procedure: Let us suppose that M(A : B||E)
is a real-valued and non-negative function, with domain
4 Here, we write the expression for a single device, a similar sit-
uation arises for the tensor product of probability distributions
and for the tensor product of devices.
5in the set of tripartite probability distributions P (ABE),
which is an upper bound on secret key rate S(A : B||E) in
SKA cryptographic paradigm [2], i.e. ∀P (ABE), M(A :
B||E) ≥ S(A : B||E). Additionally, if M(A : B||E) is
monotonic with respect to LOPC and zero for product
distributions, we call it a secrecy monotone. Squashing a
secrecy monotone will not yield an MDLOPC monotonic
quantifier in general. The quantifiers of secret correla-
tions in NSDI model can be constructed by mapping the
tripartite non-signaling device Q(ABE|XY Z) to a joint
probability distribution, as given in the definition.
Definition 2. Corresponding to each secrecy quantifiers
in SKA model M(A : B||E), we associate a non-signaling
secrecy quantifier M̂(A : B||E) acting on the tripartite
non-signaling devices:
M̂ (A : B||E)Q(ABE|XY Z)
= max
x,y
min
z
M (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )Q(ABE|XY Z) ,(6)
where (MFx,y ⊗ MGz′)Q(ABE|XY Z) =∑
z p(z|z′)Q(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z). If
Q(ABE|XY Z) ≡ E(P )(ABE|XY Z), is the com-
plete extension of a bipartite device P (AB|XY ), we call
M̂ (A : B||E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) the non-signaling squashed
secrecy quantifier. If M(A : B||E) is a secrecy monotone,
we call M̂(A : B||E) a non-signaling (squashed) secrecy
monotone.
Here by maxx,y, we mean the maximization over all
possible direct measurements,MFx,y ≡MFx ⊗MFy by the
honest parties, whereas the minz implies that the eaves-
dropper will try to minimize the function over all possi-
ble choices of measurements, direct and general. Opti-
mization over direct measurements involves a fixed input
choice whereas for general measurement one need to per-
form optimization over all possible conditional probabil-
ity distribution p(z|z′). In our MDLOPC key distillation
protocol, the eavesdropper can choose her measurement
adaptively, based on the public communication variable
Q. Hence the causal order of the optimization on the
secrecy quantifier is that Alice and Bob first choose their
optimal measurements, and then Eve performs her part.
This gives her the maximal operational power to reduce
the correlations between the honest parties 5.
The motivation to use the term “squashed” in the
above measures, comes from the fact that the definition
of squashed entanglement, of an arbitrary quantum state
ρAB , contains an optimization over all possible extensions
ρABE , where trE(ρABE) = ρAB . This arbitrary exten-
sion ρABE can be obtained from the purification |ψ〉ABE
of the quantum state [39]. In the analogy of these, here
we use the complete extension E(P ), the non-signaling
5 One can also consider the reverse order of optimization, but that
opens up a different, uncommon paradigm of key distillation.
equivalent of quantum purification, which is the key in-
gredient to perform an optimization over all possible non-
signaling extensions [42] of a given device P . The secrecy
quantifiers, we have used for squashing are the mutual in-
formation I(A : B), the conditional mutual information
I(A : B|E), the intrinsic information I(A : B ↓ E) [46]
and the reduced intrinsic information I(A : B ↓↓ E) [47].
Among them, I(A : B|E), I(A : B ↓ E) and I(A : B ↓↓ E)
are the non-signaling squashed secrecy monotones.
Generic upper bound and the squashed non-locality:
Below, we use the aforementioned idea of squashing for
upper-bounding the secret key in NSDI scenario with
MDLOPC operations.
Theorem 2. The secret key rate, in the non-signaling
device-independent iid scenario achieved with MDLOPC
operations, K
(iid)
DI , from a device P is upper bounded by
any non-signaling squashed secrecy quantifier evaluated
for the complete extension of P :
∀P K(iid)DI (P ) ≤ M̂ (A : B||E)E(P ) , (7)
where P ≡ P (AB|XY ) is a single copy of a bipartite
non-signaling device shared by the honest parties, and
E(P ) ≡ E(P )(ABE|XY Z) is its complete extension to
the eavesdropper’s system.
Proof. For the proof see Sec. VI of the supplementary
material.
Theorem 2, together with Definition 2, establishes a
connection between the secret key rate in SKA and NSDI
scenario. The novelty of our approach is that not only it
connects two major security paradigm, it also opens up a
new paradigm to study more tighter upper bounds on the
key rate in NSDI scenario. In this paper, we focus on the
secrecy monotone, intrinsic information I(A : B ↓ E), for
squashing and construct squashed non-locality, as an up-
per bound on the NSDI key. We prove several important
properties of squashed non-locality, which promotes it as
an important measure of non-locality. The secrecy mono-
tone reduced intrinsic information I(A : B ↓↓ E), provide
a tighter bound on the key rate for the SKA model, as
I(A : B ↓↓ E) ≤ I(A : B ↓ E) for tripartite probability
distribution P (ABE). Hence it will also be interesting to
study the even tighter upper bound on the K
(iid)
DI , upon
squashing the I(A : B ↓↓ E). An upper bound might
seem to be readily determinable, provided the secrecy
quantifier is easily computable. However, computation
of the complete extension generally requires some effort.
Based on the secrecy quantifier of SKA model, the in-
trinsic mutual information I(A : B ↓ E), we defined the
squashed non-locality, which is given below.
Definition 3. The squashed non-locality Nsq(P ), of a
bipartite non-signaling device P := P (AB|XY ) is
Nsq(P ) : = Î (A : B ↓ E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) ,
= max
x,y
min
z
I (A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P)(ABE|XYZ)
6where E (P ) := E (P ) (ABE|XY Z) is the complete ex-
tension of the device P [42].
From the definition of complete extension given in Ref.
[42], one knows that for an arbitrary device, it is the col-
lection of all possible minimal ensembles of the device.
For example, in the polytope of two binary input and
two binary output devices (2, 2, 2, 2), a device lying on
isotropic line between Popescu-Rohrlich and Tsirelson’s
behaviour have up to 354 minimal ensembles (achieved
for the Tsirelson’s box) although a priori there are 880946
of ensambles that can be potentially minimal [42]. Hence,
obtaining all possible minimal ensembles, and find out
the complete structure of the CE may be an arduous
tasks. However, we observe that to obtain a non-trivial
upper bound on the Nsq, not the whole complete exten-
sion has to be even known.
We collect below certain properties of the above mea-
sure, some of them used in what follows, and some of
which are independently interesting in the context of non-
locality.
Proposition 1. Besides being non-faithful the squashed
non-locality satisfies the following properties:
1. Positivite. It is non-negative real function of bi-
partite non-signaling devices, and equal to zero for
local devices.6.
2. Monotonic with respect to MDLOPC class of op-
erations.
3. Convex with respect to mixture of devices.
4. Superadditive over joint non-signaling devices.
5. Additive over product devices.
6. Asymptotically continuous. ||P −Q||NS =
 ⇒ |Nsq(P )−Nsq(Q)| ≤ O( log dAB) +
O(), where dAB is the dimension (statistical)
of the support of the output distribution dAB =
maxxy suppMFx,y(P (AB|XY )) .
7. Subextensive. Nsq(P ) ≤ log (min {dA, dB}).
Proof. For the proof see Sec. VII of the supplementary
material.
Calculating Nsq for an arbitrary bipartite device P is a
nontrivial task, but we can use convexity of this measure
to simplify the procedure of finding an upper bound of
it. Asymptotic continuity is very much important in the
experimental realization of that measure. In particular,
producing the exact device is an arduous experimental
task. Essentially, easier realizable is a close approxima-
tion of a device. In such a situation, the asymptotic
continuity certifies that the value of that measure is a
6 By local we mean devices which possess a local hidden variable
model [8].
FIG. 2: Plot of several secrecy quantifiers M̂(A : B||E), as an
upper bound on K
(iid)
DI , for a bipartite binary input output
device lying on isotropic line. The dashed red line represents
squashed mutual information Î(A : B)Piso . The blue straight
line represents the non-locality cost, as well as the squashed
conditional mutual entropy Î(A : B|E)E(Piso), over the com-
plete extension E(Piso) of the given device Piso. The solid
orange line represents the upper bound on the squashed non-
locality Nsq, which is the lower convex hull of the several other
upper bounds on Nsq.
close approximation of the value for the required device.
Positivity, monotonicity, and additivity of squashed non-
locality leads to the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. The squashed non-locality is a measure of
non-local correlations contained in a bipartite device P .
Proof. Corollary 2 is a direct consequence of properties
in Proposition 1. uunionsq
We describe now, how to use the convexity of the
squashed non-locality. Consider any set of functions
F = {Fi(P )}, that are convex w.r.t. the mixture of
devices, each of which upper bounds the squashed non-
locality Fi(P ) ≥ Nsq(P ),∀i. Then the lower convex hull
(LCH) of F denoted as F (P )(≡ LCH(F)) upper bounds
Nsq(P ), i.e. Nsq(P ) ≤ F (P ), as a consequence of prop-
erty 3. To exemplify the above convexification process,
let F = {̂I(A : B)P (AB|XY ), Î(A : B|E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z)},
then Nsq(P ) ≤ F (P ) ≡ LCH(̂I(A : B)P (AB|XY ), Î(A :
B|E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z)). This fact is used in order to con-
struct the figure 2: the orange curve is in fact a convex
hull of two upper bounds that are incomparable with each
other.
Quantitative results: In figure 2, we construct nu-
merically an upper bound on the Nsq, with the help
of above specified convexification procedure. We also
draw several other squashed quantifiers for the set of
(2, 2, 2, 2) devices, lying in the isotropic line, i.e., Piso =
(1 − ε)PR + εPR. Where PR is the famous Popescu-
7Rohrlich box [27], and PR is the anti-PR box7. The non-
faithfulness of our measure, Nsq is clearly visible from the
numerical results. The orange curve is the upper bound
on Nsq and we have found that the bound reaches 0 for
ε = 0.2 (it remains equal to 0 for ε ∈ [0.2, 0.25] due to the
convexity of the measure). This is due to the fact that
in MDLOPC protocol, Eve can perform adaptive gen-
eral measurements and post-process her output through
a classical post-processing channel to reduce the correla-
tions between Alice and Bob. In the range ε ∈ [0.2, 0.25],
corresponding to each input (x, y) of the honest par-
ties, we have found a measurement and a post-processing
channel on Eve, which partitioned the device into an en-
semble of product distributions. This proves that there
exists non-locality which can not be turned into security
via MDLOPC protocols. Interestingly, these devices are
quantum realizable ones. One can conjecture, that even
the general operation including the so-called “wirings”8
can not help in distilling key out of these isotropic de-
vices. Indeed, using wirings that is necessary for the
key to be non-zero, which implies that we enter to some
extent the general scenario of key distillation for which
there is a wide class of attacks by employing the forward
signaling attacks found in [29, 30].
In the supplementary material (see Sec. X), we plot
upper bounds on Nsq for several other set of (2, 2, 2, 2)
devices. We observe that there exists some region of
non-local correlation (figure 6(a) and 6(b)), which can be
simulated by a quantum device and for which the lower
bound obtained by [17] is positive and Nsq is also non-
trivial and close to the lower bound.
Equivalence of the complete-extension based security
definition with the ensembles-based one: We show that in
the NSDI scenario, in analogy to quantum cryptography
[49, 50], there exist two different, however equivalent def-
initions of security. One connected to the notion of the
so-called distinguisher and the other one based on the
proximity in norm [51, 52]. In the case of NSDI, Ren-
ner, Ha¨nggi and Wolf [17], presents the approach via the
notion of distinguisher. To develop the latter approach,
we consider the NS norm, which is a total variational
distance for two devices mapped into probability distri-
bution with arbitrary linear operations [43], over which
we take a supremum (see [17] in this context). We then
focus on tripartite cc-d distributions (classical distribu-
tion is isomorphic to a device with unary input) as these
are encountered at the end of NSDI cryptographic proto-
col. The two classical parts are in the hands of the honest
parties, while eavesdropper holds some device. We then
show that the NS norm takes for such cc-d distribution a
closed-form expression. In particular, we prove that the
7 Anti PR box is a binary input output device, satisfy PR(ab|xy) =
1
2
δa⊕b,x.y , ∀a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1} [48]
8 Operations of feeding input of one device with the output of the
other.
supremum over Eve’s operations reduces to a maximiza-
tion over direct measurements (for the proof see Sec. III
of the supplementary material).
Our definition of NS norm security criterion, is equiv-
alent to the criteria used by Renner, Ha¨nggi and Wolf
[17], is much more prominent from the following Theo-
rem, where we develop an analogy to the results of Refs.
[49, 50], but for non-signaling devices:
Theorem 3 (Equivalence of the NSDI security crite-
ria). For an MDLOPC protocol Λ, the proximity in the
NS norm security criterion is equivalent to the criterion
based on secrecy and correctness of the protocol. That
is for any εsec + εcor ≡ ε ≥ εsec, εcor ≥ 0 the following
equivalence relation holds:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ O(ε)
⇐⇒ {(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ O(εcor) (8)
∧ (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ O(εsec)} ,
where pabort is the probability for the protocol to abort
and the constant O(ε) does not depend on any parameter
of the protocol.
Proof. For the proof see Sec. IV of the supplementary
material.
Following arguments in Ref. [49], and from the above
Theorem, we can claim that our definition of security is
restricted composable [51–53] provided the device is not
reused. In that sense, our definition diverges from that
of [17] formally in two ways. First, we use the notion of
the complete extension. This encapsulates the access of
the eavesdropper to all ensembles of the device shared by
the honest parties - the fact used in [17]. Furthermore, in
our approach, the memory of Eve is finite and minimal
without compromising her eavesdropping power. Second,
as we have mentioned, we modify the security criterion,
without loosing the effect of composability. We use the
proximity in device norm to the ideal classcial-classical-
device distribution. We show that it is equivalent to the
statement that (as it was used in [17]) the distinguisher
can not tell apart the real cc-box distribution from the
ideal one.
Discussion and open problems: In this manuscript, we
have contributed in three ways to the topics of security
and non-locality. Firstly, we have initiated a systematic
study on the upper bounds on the secret key rate on
NSDI scenario and defined a computable function, the
squashed non-locality as one of the bounds. We have
also demonstrated a direct link between the Secrete Key
Agreement scenario and that of NSDI by systematic con-
struction of the bounds in the latter case from the secrecy
monotones of the former. Interestingly this method leads
among others to a known measure of non-locality, which
is the non-locality fraction; however, it goes much beyond
that, which confirms generality of the approach.
The presented method opens a new area of study. The
numerical estimate of the upper bound suggests that only
8a limited amount of key can be obtained from quantum
devices with two binary inputs and two binary outputs
via direct measurement followed by local operations and
public communication. For the family of devices studied
here, it is below 40%. Given characterization from [54]
of the boundary of the quantum set, one can find limi-
tations on the key rate obtained via quantum mechanics
against a non-signaling adversary for the set of (2, 2, 2, 2)
devices. It appears plausible that employing similar idea
to the contextual set of observables may also lead to a
novel measure of contextuality which upper bounds their
private randomness content [55]. One of the most impor-
tant problems which arise here is a dual one - whether the
isotropic devices in (2, 2, 2, 2) scenario with less than 80%
weight of Popescu-Rohrlich box are key undistillable in
general. We have shown that one can not distill them by
MDLOPC operations, i.e., by direct measurements on de-
vice and LOPC operations, however, one might consider
that grouping several of such devices together and distill-
ing one of them via the so-called “wirings”, could lead to
a positive key if followed by MDLOPC operations. Al-
though one can not exclude this case, it is rather improb-
able, because an action of wiring, within a group of wired
devices, opens a possibility of the forward-signaling at-
tack, as discovered in [29] and developed in [30] (the two-
way signaling case was excluded already in [28]). This is
the reason why the non-signaling between individual de-
vices seems necessary precondition of security in NSDI.
In any case, looking for more tight bounds is an impor-
tant new step to be done. Perhaps such bounds should
abandon the iid model adopted here.
As the second major contribution, we have provided
a method of constructing novel measures of non-locality
and proved a number of important properties for one
of them - the squashed entanglement. The property of
asymptotic continuity, proven so far only for the relative
entropy of contextuality [56, 57], is also confirmed for this
measure. This makes it friendly in use in case of experi-
ments. Interestingly, the analogy between entanglement
and non-locality breaks here, as this measure is mani-
festly non-faithful in contrast to entanglement measures
(see also for resource theory [59]) Comparing it with the
other measure - the relative entropy of non-locality may
lead to interesting results and possibly the proof that the
latter is also an upper bound on the distillable device in-
dependent key. Exploring further the analogy between
squashed entanglement and squashed non-locality may
lead to novel analogous results in the realm of quantum
devices. We also notice that the squashing procedure can
be naturally extended to an arbitrary number of parties.
As the third contribution, we have realized a novel
idea of incorporating the eavesdropper in the scenario
by applying the newly introduced concept of the com-
plete extension [42]. Eve controls the additional inter-
faces of the extended part. This provides the NSDI pro-
tocol a structural definition like the quantum purification
did for QDD and QDI. Although the security condition
derived from this approach is equivalent to the former,
it shows a direct structural analogy between NSDI and
QDD paradigms. In consequence, the complete exten-
sion models an adversary with minimal memory required
for ultimate eavesdropping power. The amount of mem-
ory needed for a given attack in a non-signaling scenario
to best our knowledge has not been studied so far and
deserves attention in the future. To formalize security,
we considered the NS norm analogs to the trace norm
in quantum mechanics, and we obtained that our defini-
tion of security is composedly secure if the same device is
not reused in composing the protocols. The properties of
this NS norm computed on classical-classical-devices may
prove useful as well in the context of Generalized Prob-
abilistic Theory [40, 41, 60]. Moreover, the MDLOPC
class of key distillation protocol, assumed here, allowed
the honest parties to perform only direct measurement
on their respective part of the shared device. It is still
open for debate and interesting in its own how the key
rate has changed if there is an access of randomness, pri-
vate from Eve, which can be used for performing general
measurements. As in the latter scenario, Eve can not
have the complete extension of the entire system.
Note added
On the completion of the main results of this article
contained in Sections III, and IX in the supplemental ma-
terial, we have noticed the paper E. Kaur, M. Wilde and
A. Winter [38] also related to upper bounds on device in-
dependent key. The proofs of monotonicity, subadditivity
and additivity over tensor product devices (see Sections
VII C and VII D of the supplemental material), were in-
spired by the analogous result for the squashed intrinsic
non-locality presented there. It also encouraged us to
prove the following additional properties: subextensivity
and asymptotic continuity.
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List of Symbols:
P(AB|XY) : Bipartite non-signaling device.
P(ABE|XYZ) : Tripartite non-signaling device.
P(ABE) : Tripartite probability distribution.
|ψ〉ABE : A pure tripartite quantum state.
S(A : B||E) : Secure key rate in SKA model.
I(A : B) : Mutual information.
I(A : B|E) : Conditional mutual information.
I(A : B ↓ E) : Intrinsic information.
I(A : B ↓↓ E) : Reduced intrinsic information.
KD(ρAB) : Key rate in QDD scenario.
Isq(ρAB) : Quantum squashed entanglement.
KDI : Non-signaling Device independent key rate
Nsq(P) : Non-signaling squashed non-locality
E(P) : Complete extension of a device P .
M : Measurements, maps devices to distributions.
MF : Full direct measurements.
MG : General measurements.
ΛN : MDLOPC protocol of key distribution acting on N iid copies of a device.
Λ : The set of all MDLOPC protocol {ΛN}.
P(AB|XY)⊗N : Tensor product of N iid copies of the device P .
E (P⊗N) : Complete extension of N iid copies of the device P .
PdNideal : Ideal cc-d distribution of dimension dN .
||P−Q||NS : Non-signaling device norm of two devices P and Q.
O : All possible linear operations which map a device to a distribution.
SA : The set of all possible key string in part of Alice after the MDLOPC operation.
SB : The set of all possible key string in part of Bob after the MDLOPC operation.
Q : Classical communication variable.
R(Λ|P) : NSDI key rate for a particular MDLOPC protocol.
M(A : B||E) : Secrecy quantifiers of probability distribution P (ABE)
M̂(A : B||E) : Non-signaling squashed secrecy quantifiers of the device P .
PR : Popescu Rohrlich box
PR : Complementary box to Popescu Rohrlich box.
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Piso : Device lying on the isotropic line connecting PR and P¯R box.
ε : Error in the CHSH game.
PE : Extremal device in the polytope of all non-signaling devices.
{pi,Pi} : An ensemble of a device P .
{pi,PiE} : Pure members ensemble of the device P .
D : A dice, source of additional randomness.
W : Variable designate wirings between two devices.
PN : LOPC operations on N copies of the distribution.
P : Class of LOPC operations {PN}∞N=1, also a protocol for SKA model.
PB,A1|X1 : A classical-device distribution.
SABE : Total state of the system after the MDLOPC protocol.
PrealSA,SB,Q,E|Z : Classical-classical-device distribution after the execution of a real protocol.
pabort : Probability of aborting the protocol.
P
real|abort
SA,SB,Q,E|Z : Classical-classical-device distribution after the execution of a real protocol
conditioning of aborting.
P
real|pass
SA,SB,Q,E|Z : Classical-classical-device distribution after the execution of a real protocol
conditioning of not aborting.
P
ideal|pass
SA,SB,Q,E|Z : Classical-classical-device distribution after the execution of an ideal protocol
conditioning of not aborting.
SAE : State of the system after the protocol in part of Alice and Eve.
D(P,Q) : Distance of two devices P and Q.
P[SA 6= SB] : Probability of not having the same key strings between Alice and Bob.
dimA(PN
(
(P(ABE))N
)
: Dimension of part A after the LOPC operation on the N copies of the probability
distribution.
Ci : Message sent from Alice to Bob as part of SKA protocol or vice versa.
Ct : Collection of all messages Ct = C1C2 . . . Ct sent between Alice and Bob in the tth
step.
I(S : CtEN) : Mutual information between the final key string and Eve’s information.
H(S) : Entropy of the final key S.
ΛηN : η optimal MDLOPC protocol on N iid copies of the device.
PηN : η optimal LOPC protocol on N iid copies of the distribution.
E˜(P) : Overcomplete extension of the device P .
x,yPηN : Measurement dependent η optimal LOPC protocol on N iid copies of the distribu-
tion.
ΩLOPC : LOPC operations involve general measurements on the devices.
||P−Q||resNS : Restricted NS norm of two devices.
NC : Non-locality cost of a non-signaling device.
C(P) : Non-locality fraction of a non-signaling device P .
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Supplemental Material
Notation: In Supplemental Material we adapt two different notations for conditional probability distributions
(devices). We do this to avoid small fonts in multi-level mathematical expressions that appear in forthcoming parts of
this work and hence to make them more readable.
I. DEFINITION OF ENTROPIC FUNCTIONS
Suppose A,B and E are discrete random variables, with outcomes a ∈ A, b ∈ B and e ∈ E. Let P (ABE) ≡ p(abe)
be the joint probability distribution of getting the values a, b and e.
• The Shannon entropy of a random variable is defined as
H(A) = −
∑
a
p(a) log2 p(a), (9)
H(AB) = −
∑
ab
p(ab) log2 p(ab), (10)
H(ABE) = −
∑
abe
p(abe) log2 p(abe), (11)
where, p(ab) =
∑
e p(abe) and p(a) =
∑
b p(ab) are the marginals of the joint probability distribution p(abe).
• The conditional Shannon entropy of any random variable A with respect to the random variable B, quan-
tifying the uncertainty remaining in A when one already knows about B, is given by
H(A|B) =
∑
b
p(b)H(A|B = b) = H(AB)−H(B). (12)
• Mutual information I(A : B), measuring the correlations between A and B, is defined as
I(A : B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(AB). (13)
• The conditional mutual information I(A : B|E), quantifying the correlation remaining between variables A
and B conditioned upon the knowledge about value of third variable E, is given by
I(A : B|E) =
∑
e
I(A : B|E = e) (14)
= H(A|E)−H(B|E)−H(AB|E). (15)
• The intrinsic conditional mutual information I(A : B ↓ E) is
I(A : B ↓ E) = inf
ΘE′|E
I(A : B|E′), (16)
where I(A : B|E′) is the conditional mutual information of the probability distribution P (ABE′) =∑
e ΘE′|E(E
′|E = e)P (AB,E = e), while the infimum is taken over all possible conditional channels ΘE|′E .
• The reduced intrinsic conditional mutual information [47] of random variables A and B given E, denoted
by I(A : B ↓↓ E) is defined as
I(A : B ↓↓ E) = inf
ΘU|ABE
(I(A : B ↓ EU) +H(U)) , (17)
where the infimum is taken over all possible conditional channels ΘU |ABE .
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II. THE WORLD OF NON-SIGNALING DEVICES AND THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCENERIO
In the NSDI cryptographic scenario, we have considered that the honest parties, Alice and Bob, share a cryp-
tographic device of unknown internal structure, a non-signaling conditional probability distribution P (AB|XY ) ≡
PAB|XY (we skip commas between the names of variables for convenience). We refer to P (AB|XY ), as a non-signaling
device throughout our paper. Here A, B, X and Y are random variables and a ∈ A, b ∈ B, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are
the values of those random variables. The indices x and y are considered to be the choice of inputs (or a set of direct
measurements) by the honest parties, whereas the respective outcomes are denoted by a and b. The non-signaling
condition on PAB|XY (ab|xy) is defined as
PA|X(a|x) =
∑
b
PAB|XY (ab|xy) =
∑
b
PAB|XY (ab|xy′) ∀ a, x, y, y′, (18)
PB|Y (b|y) =
∑
a
PAB|XY (ab|xy) =
∑
a
PAB|XY (ab|x′y) ∀ b, x, x′, y. (19)
We incorporate the eavesdropper (Eve) in system by giving her the access to the additional interfaces of the com-
plete extension (CE) [42], of the shared device. We denote E(P )ABE|XY Z(abe|xyz), as CE of the bipartite device
PAB|XY (ab|xy), which is defined in Sec. II A, where the input z ∈ Z and the corresponding output e ∈ E, are in part
of Eve. Additionally, Eve can also use local randomness, for both generating mixed measurements and post-processing
the output of her device, which gives her the ultimate operational eavesdropping power, as she can access all possible
ensembles of the extended device, given in Ref. [42]. This protocol of key distribution is a device independent protocol
in presence of a non-signaling Eve, as Eve’s action is only restricted by no-faster than light signal transmission.
A. The notion of the complete extension
For an arbitrary device P (A|X), one can always define its extension P (AE|XZ) in a higher dimensional space,
such that
∑
e∈E P (AE|XZ) = P (A|X), ∀z ∈ Z. Obviously, the extension is non-signaling. There are many such
non-signaling extensions in recent times [15–17, 23]. The complete extension defined in [42], is a lowest possible
dimensional extension, that possesses all the basic properties of quantum purification in general except extremality.
Let us consider the polytope of non-signaling devices (the conditional probability distributions), with fixed number
of parties and fixed input and output choices. An arbitrary device P , in that polytope can always be expanded as a
convex combination of the extremal (pure) devices {P iE}, as P =
∑
i piP
i
E . The ensemble {pi, P iE} will be called a
pure members ensemble (PME). Clearly, the decomposition {pi} is not unique, unless we have the minimal ensemble
[42].
Definition 4 (Minimal ensemble). A pure members ensemble, {pi, P iE} will be called a minimal ensemble of P , if all
the members are pure and if any proper subset of the family {P iE} for any new choices of the corresponding probabilities
{p′i} is not an ensemble of the device P.
We can now invoke the definition of a complete extension. Qualitatively, it is such an extension of a device, which
enables to produce the minimal ensembles of that device, corresponding to each input choices of the extended part.
The complete extension is by definition a non-signaling extension of the shared devices between any two subsystems,
which makes it suitable for use in the NSDI cryptography.
Definition 5 (Complete extension [42]). Given a device PA(A|X), we say that a device E(P )AX (AE|XZ) is its
complete extension to system X if for any z ∈ Z and e ∈ E there holds
E(P )AX (A,E = e|X,Z = z) = p(e|z)P e,zA (A|X), (20)
such that the ensemble {p(e|z)P e,zA (A|X)} is a minimal ensemble of the device PA(A|X), and corresponding to each
minimal ensemble with the property that it is an ensemble of the device PA(A|X), there is exactly one z ∈ Z which
generates it.
Here we slightly abuse the notation, so by PA(A|X) we mean the device PA|X(a|x) with random variables A and X,
corresponding to input x and output a. The subscript A denotes that the device is in possession of party A. Similarly,
the subscript X , for the complete extension E(P )AX (AE|XZ), stands for the extending party X , who control the
additional interfaces Z and E.
The complete extension satisfies the following properties like the quantum purification:
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1. ACCESS: A complete extension of a device P , together with access to arbitrary randomness, gives access to any
ensemble of a device P .
2. GENERATION: The extending system of the complete extension gives access to any possible (even mixed)
ensemble of the purified device.
B. Possible eavesdropping actions
In this section, we define the building blocks of the set of allowed operations that the non-signaling eavesdropper
can perform. In every device independent key distribution protocol, the honest parties hold a non-signaling device,
whose internal structure is completely unknown to them. Their task is to share a cryptographically secure key,
which is correct between the honest parties and completely secret with respect to the eavesdropper [50], by iterative
use of the device P (AB|XY ). As we are interested in finding the upper bound on the key rate, we consider the
attacks by the eavesdropper as independent and identically distributed (iid) attack. In this attack, the eavesdropper
prepare N iid devices
(
P (AB|XY ))⊗N ≡ P⊗N (AB|XY ) for Alice and Bob, and holds the extended part of the CE
E(P⊗N )(ABE|XY Z), where A = A1A2 · · ·AN , and similarly for B, X and Y . Now Eve can do the possible actions
on her input and output of the extended system:
1. Full direct measurement, {MFz } defined by choosing only one input Z = z at a time. The inputs correspond
to the choices of different minimal ensembles. In a cryptographic sense, some inputs are in favour of Eve and
some are not.
2. General measurement, {MGz }, defined by a probabilistic choice of direct measurements MGz =
∑
z′ p(z
′|z)MFz′ .
Upon each choice of general measurement on the CE of the shared device, Eve can generate any pure members
ensemble of the device. Here {p(z′|z)} represents the dice, an external randomness.
3. Classical post-processing channel ΘE′|E on the output of the CE of extending party. Taken together with input
randomizer, gives access to all ensembles (possibly mixed) in part of the device shared by honest parties.
4. Eve can also listen, i.e., collecting classical information exchanged between the honest parties.
The most general strategy of the eavesdropper is to utilize both the input randomizer and the post-processing
channel. Any other strategy is a specific case of the general one. For example, the full direct measurement can be
considered as a combination of deterministic dice and an identity post-processing channel. One of the most important
assumptions used by us is that the iid devices cannot signal between each other.
C. Cryptographic protocol
In this section, we define the building blocks of the set of operations that the honest parties can perform for sharing
a cryptographically secure key. In case of non-signaling device independent protocol, the honest parties can perform
the following operations in their shared devices:
1. Full direct measurements on the input, i.e., setting some of the inputs X, Y to certain fixed values x, y, followed
by any composition of operations 2 and 3 below:
2. Classical post-processing of the distribution
3. Public communication.
We call this class of operations as Measurement on Devices followed by Local Operations and Public Communications
(MDLOPC) [24]. Here we do not consider the honest parties performing wirings between their subsystems due to
the fact that the forward signaling between the subsystems has been proved to be an insecure procedure for many
important examples of post-processing [29, 30]. Limitation from general measurement to the direct one is due to
the fact that in the case of the former Eve does not have access to correlation with the whole system of Alice and
Bob while maintaining the access to correlations only with its subsystem. In the MDLOPC class, we do not restrict
Eve from performing any wirings. She does it whenever she chooses her input adaptively after listening to public
communication.
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Remark 1. In order to provide an ultimate operational power to a completely non-signaling Eve, through the access of
CE, we restrict the honest parties to perform any general measurement, i.e., probabilistic choice of direct measurement.
Notice that if we allow any local randomness on honest parties side, which can be used to choose measurements (inputs
of the device) probabilistically, then Eve would no longer possess the CE of the device shared by them. Suppose, Alice
and Bob use the additional randomness p(x|x′) and p(y|y′) respectively, in the input of their part of the shared device.
This changes the given device PAB|XY (ab|xy) to
∑
x
∑
y p(x|x′)p(y|y′)PAB|XY (ab|xy) ≡ QAB|X′Y ′(ab|x′y′). Hence,
having access of the additional interfaces of the CE of the device P does not imply the same for the new device Q.
Eve can not simply generate all possible ensembles of Q by accessing all possible ensembles of P , which restricts Eves
power. If we allow for the CE to include the new randomness, we are back to the original problem presented here.
In quantum cryptographic protocol, the local randomness was shown to be useful [61] in tightening of the lower bound
on the secure key rate, where it was used as a part of classical post-processing. In our protocol, we want to introduce
the local randomness (public as well as private) for the task of choosing the inputs of the shared device appropriately,
where the eavesdropper holds the CE of the initial device. This leads to a paradigm shift. The upper bound on the
secret key rate in a case of any local public randomness in hands of the honest parties is an interesting problem on its
own. One can investigate this bound by considering that Eve holds the CE of the initial device probabilistically.
In our cryptographic protocol, we prove the security when the Eve’s attacking strategy is to prepare N iid copies
of a non-signaling device P (AB|XY ), and hands them over to the honest parties. Eve controls the CE of the full
system, i.e., (P (AB|XY ))⊗N . It is important to note that CE of a tensor product of devices is not a tensor product
of CE’s of these devices. This is the most general eavesdropping strategy (in the iid case) since it gives to Eve access
to all possible statistical ensembles of the shared device. The introduction of CE in this NSDI scenario, encompasses
a structural way to access to all ensembles of the extended device, which is the key point in all NSDI security protocol
[14–17, 21–24].
Remark 2. By tensor product, we mean the concept of max tensor product [45]. As there is no natural definition
of tensor product between the probability distributions. We treat them as devices with unary input [48]. In that
case, there arises a natural definition of a partial trace, a linear map, such that for A ∈ ΩA and B ∈ ΩB, we have
TrB [A⊗B] = A.
III. FEATURES OF THE NS NORM
The NS device norm introduced in equation (2) that has its main application in Corollary 1 strongly relies on
the notion of the distinguishing system [17, 28, 62]. The distinguishing system, also dubbed as distinguisher is an
external black box type device having the same interfaces as the original device (it has one additional output) however
its inputs are interchanged into outputs and vice versa. The structure of distinguishing system allows it then to be
connected to the interfaces of the original device. For each pair of systems to be distinguished the distinguisher is
devised in such a way that it attains maximal guessing advantage to distinguish between two examined devices. For
a far more detailed description of the distinguishing system we refer the reader to [62].
In heuristic approach the NS norm is a maximal guessing advantage for a distinguisher to distinguish between two
devices and plays a role of a composable distance [49, 62]:
||P −Q||NS = D(P,Q). (21)
Devices with unary inputs are isomorphic to probability distributions. For them, the NS norm is proportional to
the variational distance. The results of this section although seem to be abstract, they have a direct implication in
distinguishing the cc-d state at the end of the MDLOPC protocol.
Remark 3. The definition of NS device norm seems to be highly abstract and hard to compute, as it takes a supremum
over all possible linear operations. According to our best knowledge these operations has not been characterized yet
in literature. We do not target to describe this class of operations, instead we construct most general action of the
distinguishing system on cc-d states. We identify the operations on the devices the distinguisher can perform on it
are, i) a composition of wirings and prior to input classical communication (WIPCC), described in [63], ii) direct or
general measurements, followed by classical post-processing.
We denote any set of measurements by the symbol Mij , with i ∈ {F,G}. Here, j ∈ {x, y, z} stands for some
measurement choices performed in part of Alice, Bob and Eve’s system respectively, whereas F represents full direct
measurement and G represents general measurement, which we will describe below for clarity.
Full direct measurement MFx : A full direct measurement acting on a device P (A|X) ≡ PA|X , is equivalent to
choosing an input x ∈ X, resulting with a conditional probability distribution,
MFx (P (A|X)) = P (A|X = x). (22)
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FIG. 3: Schematic diagram of deterministic wiring between the cc-d distribution PA1|X1B and an arbitrary external device
(called a dice) DA2|X2 . Fig. (a) represents the wiring from the cc-d distribution to the external device, W→, and Fig. (b)
represents the converse one, i.e., a wiring from external device to the cc-d distribution, W←. The diagram is motivated by [64].
Different x correspond to different measurements (inputs).
General measurement MGx : A general measurement is a mixture of direct measurements,MGx′ =
∑
x p(x|x′)MFx ,
and its action is described as
MGx′(P (A|X)) =
∑
x
p(x|x′)MFx (P (A|X)) =
∑
x
p(x|x′)P (A|X = x), (23)
with a conditional probability distribution p(x|x′) satisfying ∑x p(x|x′) = 1 ∀x′. Here different x′ indicate different
choices of a general measurement.
Now for a given multipartite device P (ABE|XY Z), when the honest parties perform the MDLOPC protocol on
it, i.e., perform measurements in their respective parts and post-process their data by local operations and public
communication, it transforms th device into a classical-classical device distribution. The NS norm for such a device
takes the following form.
Proposition 2. For the c-d states (alike those shared at the end of the MDLOPC-protocol ΛN ), i.e., the many parties
non-signaling device for which only a single party has not unary input, the NS norm takes the form∣∣∣∣∣∣P 1B,A|X − P 2B,A|X ∣∣∣∣∣∣
NS
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
MF
∑
a
∣∣∣MF (P 1B,A|X) (b, a)−MF (P 2B,A|X) (b, a)∣∣∣ , (24)
where b ∈ B is a multi-variable corresponding to outputs of c part of the c-d distribution.
Proof. For the conciseness of the proof we consider c-device states PB,A1|X1 (see Fig. 3), but our results are valid for
c-d distributions of arbitrary (finite) dimension. For the sake of simplicity, we omit the unary input in the places
where it does not lead to any ambiguity. To attain the supremum over all operations given in equation (1), we have to
consider all possible reasonable actions of the distinguisher [43]. These can be always decomposed into a composition
of several operations belonging to disjoint sub-classes of different operational meaning. Firstly, the distinguisher can
make use of external randomness which in general may depend on the output of the classical part of the system
B. We incorporate this randomness by combining systems to be distinguished with an external system, DA2|X2,B
called a dice. Next, the operations which we incorporate are wirings, W, which can be split into i) W→: those which
incorporate deterministic wirings from c-d system to dice, and ii) W←: those which incorporate deterministic wirings
from a dice into the input of c-d system. The wiring can depend on B as well. The possible action of the distinguisher
upon knowing the value of B is to design the wirings of both classes and then to prepare a mixture (with a probability
depending on the value of classical output as well) by discarding the knowledge upon which the type of wiring was
implemented. In our proof we consider supremum over external systems DA2|X2B , so without loss of generality, we
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can consider only wirings employing deterministic functions. The notation for wirings is adapted from [64], and as
depicted in Fig. 3. We also use a similar idea to that in [64]. The domains and codomains of functions f and g, which
determine the wiring, are always adjusted to the sizes of inputs and outputs. We consider deterministic wiring, so
the sets of {f} and {g} are always finite.
Another class of operations, is that of the general measurements,MG, performed on the wired system, followed by
the classical post-processing P, of all the outcomes based on the knowledge of the whole preparation and the input.
The NS device norm distance can be phrased as
∣∣∣∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1 − P 2B,A1|X1∣∣∣∣∣∣NS = supO 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣O(P 1B,A1|X1)−O(P 2B,A1|X1)∣∣∣∣∣∣1 (25)
= sup
D
sup
W
sup
MG
sup
P
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣(P ◦MG ◦W) (P 1B,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B)− (P ◦MG ◦W) (P 2B,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B)∣∣∣∣∣∣1 , (26)
where the supremums are taken over operations being adaptive with respect to the output B. When acting on systems
with a fixed value of classical output B, this can be rephrased using the same symbols for non-adaptive operations.
∣∣∣∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1 − P 2B,A1|X1∣∣∣∣∣∣NS
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
W
sup
MG
sup
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣(P ◦MG ◦W) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (P ◦MG ◦W) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1 . (27)
The first step to simplify the expression above is to notice that ||· − ·||1 is contractive under classical post-processing
on probability distributions. Since the trivial post-processing is always accessible, we obtain
∣∣∣∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1 − P 2B,A1|X1 ∣∣∣∣∣∣NS
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
W
sup
MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1 . (28)
As it was stated informally above, the general wiring, W, can be constructed adaptively upon the knowledge of the
values of the output B, as a probabilistic combination of two types of wirings conv{W→,W←} (see Fig. 3). In the
following lines, we show that the strategy of mixing is not optimal. However in general, the cardinalities of inputs
and outputs in different (types) of wiring can be different. In order to overcome this obstacle, we consider a common
supremum over a convex set of wirings composed with measurements. From operational point of view this procedure
means that the knowledge about the preparation was discarded after the optimal measurement for each type of wiring
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was already chosen.∣∣∣∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1 − P 2B,A1|X1 ∣∣∣∣∣∣NS
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
{p←b ,p→b }
sup
W←◦MG
sup
W→◦MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(p←b (MG ◦W←) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)
+p→b
(MG ◦W→) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b))
−
(
p←b
(MG ◦W←) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b) + p→b (MG ◦W→) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b))∣∣∣∣∣∣1 (29)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
{p←b ,p→b }
(
sup
W←◦MG
p←b
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W←) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)
− (MG ◦W←) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1
+ sup
W→◦MG
p→b
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W→) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W→) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1
)
(30)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
max
{
sup
W←
sup
MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W←) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W←) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1
, sup
W→
sup
MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W→) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W→) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1
}
(31)
= max
{
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
W←
sup
MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W←) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W←) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1
,
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
W→
sup
MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W→) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W→) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1
}
.(32)
In the following two paragraphs, we discuss about the probability distributions, obtained after the wiringsW→ and
W←.
W→) The first thing to do is to identify a probability distribution we obtain after wiring. The state of the system
after distinguisher obtains a classical output B = b, which is prior to input in the considered scenario, is given by
PA1|X1,B=b⊗DA2|X2B=b, see Fig. 3(a). The distinguisher can apply wirings from P to D, controlled by fb, gb, which
can depend on outcome b. This is how communication can help the eavesdropper. The probability distribution after
the wiring W→ is given by
W→ (PA1|X1,B ⊗DA2|X2,B)A′1|X1,B (a′1|x′1, b)
=
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
PA1|X1,B(a1|x′1, b)DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b) (33)
The wiring can be chosen adaptively to the outcome of the variable B, which we express by equipping f and g with
a subscript b. The probability distribution for the device after a wiring is given by
Pfb,gbB,A′1|X′1(b, a
′
1|x′1) : = PB|X1(b|x′1)
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
PA1|X1,B(a1|x′1, b)DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b) (34)
=
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
PB,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b) (35)
W←). The first thing to do is again to identify a probability distribution after a wiring. However, we are now in a
comfortable situation, as it is enough to interchange inputs of PA1|X1,B and DA2|X2,B systems, see Fig. 3(b).
Pfb,gbB,A′1|X′1(b, a
′
1|x′1) :=
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
PB,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b). (36)
At this point we are ready to calculate both terms in Equation (32) separately:
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a) The first term:
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
W→
sup
MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W→) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W→) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1 (37)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
sup
MG
∑
a′1
∣∣∣MG (P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)−MG (P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)∣∣∣ (38)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
sup
{ωi}
∑
a′1
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
ωiMFi
(
P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1
)
(b, a′1)−
∑
i
ωiMFi
(
P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1
)
(b, a′1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (39)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
sup
{ωi}
∑
a′1
∑
i
ωi
∣∣∣MFi (P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)−MFi (P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)∣∣∣ (40)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∣∣∣P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1(b, a′1|x′1)− P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1(b, a′1|x′1)∣∣∣ (41)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b)
−
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (42)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b)
(
P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (43)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b)
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)∣∣∣ (44)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a1,a2
DA2|X2,B(a2|fb(a1, x′1), b)
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)∣∣∣ (45)
=
1
2
∑
b
max
x′1
∑
a1
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|x′1)∣∣∣ (46)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
MF
∑
a1
∣∣∣MF (P 1B,A1|X1) (b, a1)−MF (P 2B,A1|X1) (b, a1)∣∣∣ . (47)
The important point was to notice that
∑
a′1
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
h(a1, a2) =
∑
a1,a2
h(a1, a2).
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b) Now the second term:
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
W←
sup
MG
∣∣∣∣∣∣(MG ◦W←) (P 1B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)− (MG ◦W←) (P 2B=b,A1|X1 ⊗DA2|X2,B=b)∣∣∣∣∣∣1(48)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
sup
MG
∑
a′1
∣∣∣MG (P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)−MG (P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)∣∣∣ (49)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
sup
{ωi}
∑
a′1
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
ωiMFi
(
P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1
)
(b, a′1)−
∑
i
ωiMFi
(
P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1
)
(b, a′1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (50)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
sup
{ωi}
∑
a′1
∑
i
ωi
∣∣∣MFi (P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)−MFi (P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1) (b, a′1)∣∣∣ (51)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∣∣∣P 1fb,gbB,A′1|X′1(b, a′1|x′1)− P 2fb,gbB,A′1|X′1(b, a′1|x′1)∣∣∣ (52)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b) (53)
−
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (54)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b)
(
P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1)) (55)
− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))
)∣∣∣ (56)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb,gb
max
x′1
∑
a′1
∑
a1,a2: gb(a1,a2,x′1)=a
′
1
DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b)
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1)) (57)
− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))
∣∣∣ (58)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb
max
x′1
∑
a1,a2
DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b)
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))∣∣∣ (59)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb
max
x′1
∑
a2
DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b)
∑
a1
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a2, x′1))∣∣∣ (60)
≤ 1
2
∑
b
sup
D
sup
fb
max
x′1
∑
a2
DA2|X2,B(a2|x′1, b) max
a′2
∑
a1
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a′2, x′1))− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a′2, x′1))∣∣∣ (61)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
fb
max
x′1
max
a′2
∑
a1
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a′2, x′1))− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|fb(a′2, x′1))∣∣∣ (62)
=
1
2
∑
b
max
x1
∑
a1
∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1(b, a1|x1)− P 2B,A1|X1(b, a1|x1)∣∣∣ (63)
=
1
2
∑
b
sup
MF
∑
a1
∣∣∣MF (P 1B,A1|X1) (b, a1)−MF (P 2B,A1|X1) (b, a1)∣∣∣ . (64)
From a), b) and Eq. (32) we conclude that:∣∣∣∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1 − P 2B,A1|X1∣∣∣∣∣∣NS ≤ 12 ∑
b
sup
MF
∑
a1
∣∣∣MF (P 1B,A1|X1) (b, a1)−MF (P 2B,A1|X1) (b, a1)∣∣∣ . (65)
As the r.h.s. of the expression above realizes a particular strategy of the distinguisher within considered NS norm,
the above inequality can be always saturated, what yields:∣∣∣∣∣∣P 1B,A1|X1 − P 2B,A1|X1∣∣∣∣∣∣NS = 12 ∑
b
sup
MF
∑
a1
∣∣∣MF (P 1B,A1|X1) (b, a1)−MF (P 2B,A1|X1) (b, a1)∣∣∣ . (66)
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uunionsq
Proposition 2 above yields an immediate Corollary.
Corollary 1. For the cc-d states shared at the end of the MDLOPC protocol ΛN , the NS norm can be rephrased with
a simplified expression:∣∣∣∣PSA,SB ,Q,E|Z −QSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣NS = 12 ∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣PSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)−QSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)∣∣ ,
where maxz, stands for the maximization over all possible direct measurements performed by the eavesdropper.
Proof. For the proof it is enough to substitute B ≡ (SA, SB , Q), A1 ≡ E and X1 ≡ Z in Proposition 2. This gives us
cc-d states shared at the end of the MDLOPC protocol ΛN . uunionsq
IV. EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN SECURITY CRITERIA FOR NSDI PROTOCOLS
The iid NSDI key rate in Definition 1 is implicitly dependent on proximity in NS device norm security criterion
in equation . In the quantum case, it was shown in [49, 50] that the proximity in norm (of a state to the ideal one)
is equivalent to correctness and secrecy of a protocol. These two notions are employed in a protocol independent
definition of security [52]. In this Section we show that the same holds for MDLOPC protocols.
In what follows we employ the notions of real, ideal and intermediate systems. A real system is a device shared
by parties in a real protocol. An ideal device is the one which possesses the same distribution on Eve’s side as
a real device, however, possesses perfect (uniform) correlations between Alice and Bob (this makes honest parties
uncorrelated with Eve). An intermediate device is a different kind of device in which Alice and Bob always share fully
correlated keys , however, the distribution of the keys is not uniform (Eve’s part stays unchanged). The usual part of
any protocol employing nonlocal correlations is an acceptance phase in which honest parties decide (upon some test)
whether to abort or to proceed.
Remark 4. In the rest of this article, we assume that the protocol is after the acceptance phase, although for the full
generality we take a step back and also consider a possibility of aborting. We will later set the probability of aborting
to zero. The superscript pass is used to remind that the states of systems are considered in the phase of a protocol
when the test is already done.
Theorem 3 is essential in order to compare the secret key of our scenario to these of other cryptographic schemes
or even certain protocols, in particular to the results of Ha¨nggi, Renner and Wolf [17], with the upper bounds that
will be presented in this paper.
Composability concept in security is an area of research concerned with composing cryptographic primitives into
more complex ones while keeping high security level. In the universal composability approach, a cryptographic
primitive is said to be universally composable if any functionality using this primitive is as secure as an ideal one
[52, 53]. The composable security is considered as the strongest notion of security [52, 53]. However in the device
independent scenario, so far it was not rigorously proven that this scheme is ultimately secure. Furthermore, the
results of [44] strongly suggest that it is not the case, so the problem arises when one wants to reuse the device. In
particular, if the device used for composition has some memory, then it can leak the key of the previous use. This
implies that in general the protocol is composably secure as long as the same device is not reused in the protocol.
Let us begin with a few definitions.
Definition 6 (State of the device at the end of protocol). The state of the device after the MDLOPC protocol is a
conditional probability distribution (c-d state) denoted by P realSA,SA,Q,E|Z :
P realSA,SB ,Q,E|Z = pabortP
real|abort
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z + (1− pabort)P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z . (67)
The random variables SA, SB , E are respectively outputs of Alice, Bob and Eve conditioned upon input Z of Eve.
SA, SB are the key strings hold by Alice and Bob after the protocol respectively. Q is random denoting public
communication. During the protocol Q is shared by all three parties, although Alice and Bob use it only distill the
final key and discard it after the protocol is finished. For this reason we treat Q to be random variable of Eve that
she can use for the choice of her input.
Remark 5. We follow the convention in which random variables of outputs of the device are conditioned upon
variables of inputs. This convention does not exclude a situation in which input is conditioned on some output. In
our case the input Z of Eve can still be dependent on variable of public communication Q.
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Definition 7 (Ideal output state conditioned on not aborting). The ideal output state of the device is the one which
possesses perfect correlations between honest parties that are completely uncorrelated with the eavesdropper. Local
outcomes of the eavesdropper and communication simulate the real system.
P
ideal|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) =
δsA,sB
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z). (68)
(69)
Since the honest parties are uncorrelated with Eve the ideal system can be decomposed according to tensor rule
formula for independent systems in the following way:
P
ideal|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z = P
ideal|pass
SA,SB
⊗ P ideal|passQ,E|Z . (70)
Definition 8 (State of intermediate system conditioned on not aborting). An intermediate system is the one which
bears fully correlated key strings between the honest parties, but the distribution they possess is not uniform hence
correlations are not perfect in cryptographic sense. Eavesdropper still has some correlations with the subsystems of
honest parties.
P
int|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) = δsA,sB
∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z). (71)
Since states of the intermediate and the ideal systems are constructed with respect to the state of real system, the
pabort is the same in all cases (later we consider the protocol after acceptation phase, for which pabort = 0).
For the sake of cohesion we provide definitions of secrecy, correctness and security of a cryptographic protocol in
case of non-signaling devices.
Definition 9 (ε-secrecy of a protocol). A MDLOPC key distribution protocol is ε-secret if it outputs a device for
which conditional probability distribution shared between Alice (Bob) and Eve at the end of the protocol (conditioned
on not aborting) satisfies
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε, (72)
where
PSA,Q,E|Z(sA, q, e|z) :=
∑
sB
PSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z). (73)
Definition 10 (ε-correctness). A MDLOPC key distribution protocol is ε-correct if the probability (conditioned on
not aborting) for Alice and Bob to not share the same output keys satisfies
(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ ε. (74)
Definition 11 (ε-security of a protocol). Let P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z be the state of the system shared between Alice, Bob, and
Eve after the protocol (conditioned on not aborting). Then the protocol is ε-secure if
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε, (75)
where pabort is the probability of aborting (which is the same for the real and ideal protocols).
To prove the equivalence between secrecy + correctness and security based on proximity in NS device norm, we
provide technical Lemmas, showing that proximity in NS device norm implies security and security implies proximity
in the NS norm.
Observation 1. The following equality holds.∣∣∣∣∣∣P realSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P idealSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣∣∣NS = (1− pabort) ∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣∣∣NS , (76)
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Proof. ∣∣∣∣∣∣P realSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P idealSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣∣∣NS
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣pabortP real|abortSA,SB ,Q,E|Z + (1− pabort)P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − pabortP ideal|abortSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − (1− pabort)P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣∣∣NS (77)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣pabort (P real|abortSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|abortSA,SB ,Q,E|Z)+ (1− pabort)(P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z)∣∣∣∣∣∣NS (78)
(I)
= (1− pabort)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣∣∣NS , (79)
(I) - we assume that the P
real|abort
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z and P
ideal|abort
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z are trivially same when the protocol is aborted [50]. uunionsq
Lemma 1. The NS device norm evaluated for real and intermediate states quantifies the probability of Alice and Bob
to share different key strings at the end of the protocol.∥∥∥P realSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P intSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥ = (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] (80)
Proof. From the Observation 1 we have:∥∥∥P realSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P intSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (I)= (1− pabort)∥∥∥(P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P int|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z)∥∥∥NS (81)
Now:
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P int|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)− P int|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)∣∣∣ (82)
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)− δsA,sB∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣ (83)
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣Preal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)− δsA,sB∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣ δsA,sB
+
1
2
∑
sA,q
∑
sB 6=sA
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣Preal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)− δsA,sB∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣ (84)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
sA,q
∑
sB 6=sA
max
z
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) (85)
(I)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
(∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)− P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)
)
+
1
2
∑
sA,q
∑
sB 6=sA
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) (86)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∑
sB 6=sA
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) +
1
2
∑
sA,q
∑
sB 6=sA
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) (87)
(II)
=
∑
sA,q
∑
sB 6=sA
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z) (88)
= P [SA 6= SB |pass] (89)
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where (I) and (II) are due to non-signaling condition on Eves’s input z. Finally we obtain:∥∥∥P realSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P intSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS = (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] (90)
uunionsq
Lemma 2 (Secrecy and correctness imply security). If a protocol is εsec-secret and εcor-correct then the protocol is
ε-secure, where ε = εsec + εcor.{
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ εsec and (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ εcor}
=⇒ (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z , P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ εsec + εcor = ε. (91)
Proof. To prove the security of the protocol, we can decompose the l.h.s. of Eq. (75) in the following way:∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P int|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS + ∥∥∥P int|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS, (92)
where we used the triangle inequality for the NS norm.∥∥∥P int|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS = ∣∣∣∣∣∣P int|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣∣∣NS (93)
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣∣δsA,sB
∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)−
δsA,sB
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (94)
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
δsA,sB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)−
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (95)
=
1
2
∑
sA
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)−
∑
sB
δsA,sB
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (96)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∣∣∣∣∣∣NS (97)
Using now Lemma 1 and equation 92 we have:∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ P [SA 6= SB |pass] + ∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS, (98)
Hence,
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS
≤ (1− pabort)P [SA 6= SB |pass] + (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS, (99)
Using the above inequality if a protocol is εsec-secret and εcor-correct it is also at least (εsec + εcor)-secure.{
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ εsec and (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ εcor} (100)
=⇒ (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z , P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ εsec + εcor = ε. (101)
uunionsq
We proved that if the protocol is εsec-secret and εcor-correct the its output is εsec + εcor close to ideal device in NS
device norm. To prove equivalence of security criteria we now conduct the proof in opposite direction i.e. we show
that if a output device of the protocol is ε close in NS device norm to the ideal one, then the protocol is at least
ε-secret and ε-correct.
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Lemma 3 (Security implies secrecy and correctness). If a protocol is ε-secure, then it is at least ε-secret and ε-correct.
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε
=⇒
{
(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ ε and (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε} (102)
Proof of Lemma 3. Let us prove the following first.∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≥ P [SA 6= SB |pass]. (103)
To proceed with this task we employ the Definition of the ideal system.∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (104)
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)− δsA,sB|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (105)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)− 1|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
sA
∑
sB 6=sA
max
z
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) (106)
(I)
≥ 1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B ,e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
sA
∑
sB 6=sA
max
z
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) (107)
(II)
≥ 1
2
∑
sA,q
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B ,e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
sA
∑
sB 6=sA
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) (108)
(III)
≥ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
sA,q
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B ,e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
P [SA 6= SB |pass] (109)
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
sA,q,e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−
∑
sA
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B ,q,e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
P [SA 6= SB |pass] (110)
=
1
2
∑
s′A
∑
s′B 6=s′A
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z) +
1
2
P [SA 6= SB |pass] (111)
= P [SA 6= SB |pass] , (112)
we used the triangle inequality used in (I) and (III), and the non-signaling condition in the Eve’s subsystems used in
(II).
Hence
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≥ (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] (113)
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The above inequality verifies that ε-security implies ε-correctness.
In the next step we prove:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≥ (1− pabort)∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS. (114)
Let us proceed with calculations.∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (115)
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB ,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)− δsA,sB|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (116)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)− 1|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
sA
∑
sB 6=sA
max
z
∑
e
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z) (117)
(I)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)− 1|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
P [SA 6= SB |pass] (118)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣
(
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−
∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
)
+
(∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)−
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 12P [SA 6= SB |pass] (119)
(II)
≥ 1
2
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)−
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 12P [SA 6= SB |pass] (120)
(III)
≥ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sA, q, e|z)−∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣
−
∑
sA,q
max
z
∑
e
∣∣∣∣∑
sB
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(sA, sB , q, e|z)−
1
|SA|
∑
s′A,s
′
B
P
real|pass
SA,SB ,Q,E|Z(s
′
A, s
′
B , q, e|z)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 12P [SA 6= SB |pass]
(121)
(IV )
=
∣∣∣∣12P [SA 6= SB |pass]− ∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS
∣∣∣∣+ 12P [SA 6= SB |pass] , (122)
where in (I) the second component is treated like in the previous step, reverse triangle inequality has been used in
(II), triangle inequality in (III) and in (IV) we use the results given in Eqs. (89) and (97).
We have:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (123)
≥
∣∣∣∣12 (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass]− (1− pabort)∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS
∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] (124)
28
One should now go through two separate cases:
Case 1
(
1
2P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≥
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS):
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≥ 12 (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass]
− (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS + 12 (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] (125)
= (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass]− (1− pabort) D
(
Sreal, passAE , S
ideal, pass
AE
)
(126)
≥ 2 (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS − (1− pabort)∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (127)
≥ (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (128)
Case 2
(
1
2P [SA 6= SB |pass] <
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS):
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≥ (1− pabort)∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (129)
−1
2
(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] + 1
2
(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass]
= (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (130)
Finally:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≥ (1− pabort)∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS (131)
If protocol is ε-secure we see from (103) and (114) that:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε (132)
=⇒
{
(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ ε and (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε} .
uunionsq
Once we proved the above Lemmas, we can state the Theorem regarding the equivalence between the secrecy and
correctness to the security of the NSDI protocol we have considered.
Theorem 3 (Equivalence of the security criteria). For an MDLOPC protocol Λ, the proximity in the NS norm security
criterion is equivalent to the criterion based on security and correctness. That is for any εsec +εcor ≡ ε ≥ εsec, εcor ≥ 0
the following equivalence relation holds:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ O(ε) ⇐⇒ {(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ O(εcor)
∧ (1− pabort) (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ O(εsec)} , (133)
where pabort is the probability for the protocol to abort and the constant in O(ε) does not depend on any parameter of
the protocol.
Proof of Theorem 3. From Lemma 2 we have:{
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ εsec and (1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ εcor}
=⇒ (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z , P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ εsec + εcor = ε. (134)
and from Lemma 3:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε
=⇒
{
(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ ε and (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ ε} (135)
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By combining the above implications under εsec + εcor ≡ ε ≥ εsec, εcor ≥ 0 constraints, we obtain:
(1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,SB ,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ O(ε) ⇐⇒ {(1− pabort) P [SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ O(εcor) (136)
∧ (1− pabort) (1− pabort)
∥∥∥P real|passSA,Q,E|Z − P ideal|passSA,Q,E|Z∥∥∥NS ≤ O(εsec)} , (137)
hence the corresponding notion’s are cryptographically equivalent. uunionsq
V. REPHRASING THE KEY RATE IN THE SECRET KEY AGREEMENT SCENARIO
Before we begin with the proof of the Theorem 1, let us restate the definition of secret key rate in SKA model,
already presented by Maurer [2].
Definition 12 (Secret key rate [2]). The secret key rate of A and B with respect to E, denoted S(A : B||E), is
the maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can agree on a secret key S while keeping the rate at which Eve obtains
information arbitrarily small. More precisely it is the maximal rate, R such that for every  > 0 there exists a protocol
for sufficiently large N satisfying (140)-(143), such that
1
N
I
(
S : CtEN
) ≤ , (138)
and achieving
1
N
H (S) ≥ R−  (139)
H
(
Ci|Ci−1AN
)
= 0 for odd i, (140)
H
(
Ci|Ci−1BN
)
= 0 for even i, (141)
H
(
S|CtAN) = 0, (142)
and,
H
(
S′|CtEN) = 0, (143)
where H (·) is the Shannon entropy, I(· : ·) is the mutual information, both are defined in Sec. X and Ct =
{C1, C2, . . . , Ct} is a sequence of public communication variables.
Remark 6. In the SKA model of the LOPC operations it was assumed that based on the raw keys, AN and all the
previously received messages, Alice prepare a message Ci, i odd, and send it to Bob over a pubic channel. Eve has
complete access over that channel. Bob on the other hand prepares another set of messages Ci, i even, based on his
BN and all the previous messages he receives, and send it to Alice over a same public channel. After t such iteration of
such public communication they are able to distill a final key. Hence, any LOPC protocol applicable to the probability
distribution and satisfy the above set of conditions will be included in the Maurer model of SKA protocol. This allow
us to use the upper bounds on the key rates for all such protocols.
Fact 1. From the NS norm given in Eq. (5):
||P −Q||NS ≤ ε ⇔
1
2
||M(P )−M(Q)||1 ≤ ε, ∀M (144)
whereM is a choice of input (or measurement on the device), such that it does not incorporate wirings (MDLOPC).
Proof. For the proof of Theorem 1, we need the following Lemmas,
Lemma 4. The secret key rate in SKA model has a lower bound,
sup
P
lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N (ABE)))
N
≤ S(A : B||E). (145)
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Proof. If two joint probability distributions P (ABE) and Q(ABE), are close by according to their trace distance,
then from the asymptotic continuity of the Shannon entropic functions [65, 66] we have
|H(A)P −H(A)Q| ≤  log (dimA (P )− 1) + h2 () , (146)
|I(A : E)P − I(A : E)Q| ≤ 2 log d+ 2g () , (147)
(148)
where we assume that  = 12 ||P (ABE)−Q(ABE)||1 ∈ [0, 1] and ||P (A)−Q(A)||1 ≤ ||P (ABE)−Q(ABE)||1.
The P (A) and Q(A) are the marginal probability distributions of P (ABE) and Q(ABE) respectively. And
h2 () := − log  − (1− ) log (1− ) is the binary Shannon entropy, and g () := − log  + (1 + ) log (1 + ), and
d = min{dimA (P ) ,dimB (P )}.
For the key distribution, Alice and Bob apply LOPC operations PN on the N iid copies of their shared distribution
say (P (ABE))
⊗N
, in such a manner that:
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣PN ((P (ABE))⊗N)− P ideal∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ ε, (149)
where, P ideal :=
δSA,SB
|SA| ⊗
∑
SA,SB
PN
(
(P (ABE))
⊗N
)
. (150)
Thus, the output distribution of keys (SA, SB) after protocol PN is arbitrarily close to the ideal distribution, where
perfect correlations are imposed. Note that the key distribution protocol PN , assumed here satisfies the proximity
in the trace norm protocol of key distribution. Later we will show that this protocol also satisfies the fundamental
conditions of Maurer SKA protocol namely the conditions in Eqs. (138) (139) and (143).
The variable S of Maurer’s model [2] is the key agreement SA by Alice and S
′ is SB for Bob, whereas the CtEN is
E after the protocol. From the definition of the ideal system we obtain:
H(SA)P ideal = log dimA
(
P ideal
) ≥ H(SA)P⊗N . (151)
Since dimension of ideal system matches with the dimension of the real one,
H(SA)P ideal = log dimA
(PN (P⊗N)) . (152)
Let’s set δ = εω, for any fixed ω ∈ (0, 1) and R = lim supN→∞
log dimA(PN(P⊗N))
N , where we consider all protocols
which satisfy the security condition given in Eq (IV). From the asymptotic continuity of mutual information one has
that
∀δ ∃N0 : ∀N≥N0 ,
1
N
I (SA : E)PN (P⊗N ) ≤
2ε log dN + 2g (ε)
N
≤ δ, (153)
where dN := min
{
dimA
(PN (P⊗N)) ,dimE (PN (P⊗N))}. Reconstructing second inequality of Maurer,
∀δ ∃N0 : ∀N≥N0 ,
1
N
H (SA) ≥
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N))
N
− δ, (154)
δ ≥ 1
N
H
(
Sideal
)− 1
N
H (SA) . (155)
The last inequality follows from the asymptotic continuity of the entropy of SA,
∀N≥N0
1
N
H
(
Sideal
)− 1
N
H (SA) ≤
ε log
(
dimA
(PN (P⊗N))− 1)+ h2 (ε)
N
(156)
≤
ε log
(
dimA (P )
N − 1
)
+ h2 (ε)
N
≤ δ. (157)
The same derivations can be made for SB . And with these we have shown that the constraint of Maurer LOPC
operations also satisfied by our proximity in the trace norm LOPC protocol PN . Hence, our protocol of key distribution
is also a key distribution protocol of SKA model [2], and the upper bounds on the Maurer key rate are also applicable
in our scenario. The key rate of Maurer SKA protocol can be rephrased, later on we will show that this protocol P
can be used as a part of a -secure Λ protocol for devices.
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The secret key rate S(A : B||E) is maximal R for which the above is satisfied:
∀P={PN}N S(A : B||E)P ≥ lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(P∞N=1 (P⊗N))
N
. (158)
In particular:
S(A : B||E)P ≥ sup
P
lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N))
N
. (159)
uunionsq
The result is slightly more general than Lemma 4. Let us consider two tripartite non-signaling devices
P (ABE|XY Z) and Q(ABE|XY Z), which satisfy the proximity in the NS norm as given in Eq.(2). If there ex-
ists some choice of measurements M on the three shared parties, which give rise to the probability distribution
M(P ) := P (ABE) := PM and M(Q) := Q(ABE) := QM, then from Fact 1 it is clear that if two devices satisfy the
proximity in the NS norm then the distribution emerges from the devices, due to measurements, will also satisfy the
proximity in trace norm. Then the Lemma 4 allows us to write down the following Corollary:
Corollary 3. For a tripartite non-signaling device P (ABE|XY Z), shared between the honest parties and the eaves-
dropper. For a secure key distribution the honest parties perform measurementsM and LOPC operations which satisfy
proximity in trace norm, then the key rate is upper bounded by that of the SKA model
sup
P
lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗NM (ABE)))
N
≤ S(A : B||E)PM . (160)
To obtain what is desired, the product measurement P⊗NM :=M⊗N
(
P⊗N
)
has to be imposed.
The LOPC operation PN along with the measurement operationsM⊗N acting on the N copies of a shared device,
can be consider as an element of MDLOPC class of operations ΛN = PN ◦M⊗N .
It remains to prove the converse inequality, as it is encapsulated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. The secret key rate in SKA-model has an upper bound,
S(A : B||E) ≤ sup
P
lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N (ABE)))
N
. (161)
Proof of Lemma 5. Let us suppose that there exist a protocol P that is it optimal for some probability distribution
P (ABE), and satisfies proximity in norm security condition. According to Maurer’s definition, secret key rate
S(A : B||E) is a maximal R, such that, for every  > 0,
∀N≥N0
1
N
H (S) ≥ R− δ, (162)
where like in the proof of Lemma 4, we set δ = εω, with ω ∈ (0, 1). From the relation above, it follows that
∀N≥N0 S(A : B||E)P ≤
1
N
H (S) . (163)
From the proximity in norm criteria, using inequalities of [65, 66] alike in the proof of Lemma 4, it follows that
∀N≥N0
1
N
I (S : E)PN (P⊗N ) ≤ δ. (164)
The properties of Shannon entropy allow us to write
∀N≥N0 S(A : B||E)P ≤
1
N
log |S| = log dimA
(PN (P⊗N))
N
≤ lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N))
N
. (165)
However, from the very beginning an optimal protocol was considered. Hence,
S(A : B||E)P ≤ sup
P
lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N))
N
. (166)
uunionsq
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From the Lemmas 4 and 5 it follows directly that the secret key rate in the SKA scheme can be equivalently
expressed as given in Eq. (167). uunionsq
Theorem 1. The secret key rate S(A : B||E) of SKA cryptographic model can be expressed via the following asymptotic
formula:
S(A : B||E) = sup
P
lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(PN (P⊗N (ABE)))
N
, (167)
where P are cryptographic protocols satisfying security conditions of Maurer [2], as well as the proximity in norm
security criteria, for N iid copies of the probability distribution P (ABE) and P = {PN}, part of the MDLOPC
protocol.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of inequalities in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. uunionsq
VI. UPPER BOUND ON DEVICE INDEPENDENT (IID) KEY
In this section, we will prove that the secrecy quantifiers which provides the upper bounds on the key rate in the
SKA model [2], can be used to serve as upper bounds of device independent key agreement scenario via operation of
squashing.
Theorem 2. The secret key rate, in the non-signaling device-independent iid scenario achieved with MDLOPC
operations, K
(iid)
DI , from a device P is upper bounded by any non-signaling squashed secrecy quantifier evaluated for
the complete extension of P :
∀P K(iid)DI (P ) ≤ M̂ (A : B||E)E(P ) , (168)
where P ≡ P (AB|XY ) is a single copy of a bipartite non-signaling device shared by the honest parties, and E(P ) ≡
E(P )(ABE|XY Z) is its complete extension to the eavesdropper’s system.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Λη := {ΛηN} be a MDLOPC key distribution protocol (incorporating optimal direct mea-
surements and classical post-processing) such that, for any fixed P (AB|XY ), η > 0 and any N > N0,∣∣∣∣ΛηN (E (P⊗N))− Pideal∣∣∣∣NS ≤ εN (η) N→∞−→ 0, (169)
R (ΛηN |P ) ≥ K(iid)DI (P )− η, (170)
where P (AB|XY ) is the initial device before the protocol (honest parties share N copies of it), while E(P⊗N ) :=
E(P⊗N )(ABE|XYZ) is their complete extension to eavesdropper system. The ideal device is that which contains
the perfect correlations after the protocol, P ideal :=
δSA,SB
|SA| ⊗
∑
sA,sB
ΛηN
(E (P⊗N))∣∣
SA=sA,SB=sB
. Furthermore,
εN (η) := η
1
ω for any fixed ω ∈ (0, 1) (see the proof of Lemma 4).
From the Lemma (4) we conclude that, for a fixed distribution P (ABE),
∀η>0∀N>N0∀Pη S (A : B||E) ≥
log dimA
(PηN (P⊗N (ABE)))
N
. (171)
Let us now consider a family of distributions indexed with x, y, z, E(P )(ABE|X = z, Y = y, Z = z). This family
originates from direct measurements performed by the honest parties, given that any measurement by eavesdropper
is also a direct one.
(MFx,y ⊗MFz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) := E(P )(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z). (172)
Another class of distributions arises when the eavesdropper chooses to perform any general measurement,
(MFx,y ⊗MGz′)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) =
∑
z
p(z|z′)(MFx,y ⊗MFz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) (173)
=
∑
z
p(z|z′)E(P )(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z), (174)
= E˜(P )(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z′), (175)
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where we have used the fact that the general measurement, MGz′ =
∑
z p(z|z′)MFz , consists of the probabilistic
choices of direct measurements, while the index z′ denotes the different choices of general measurement. E˜(P ) is
the overcomplete extension (OCE) of the bipartite device P , see Definition 1 of [42]. The general measurement
MGz′ =
∑
z p(z|z′)MFz on the CE of P can be considered equivalently as a direct measurement on the OCE of P .
With these distributions we can associate a family of η-optimal SKA protocols x,yPη := {x,yPηN}, which depends
on the measurement choices MFx,y of the honest parties, and can write
∀η>0∀N>N0∀x,y,z∀x,yPη
log dimA
(
x,yPηN ◦
(
(MFx,y ⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z)
)⊗N)
N
≤ S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z). (176)
Due to the non-signaling principle (from E to AB systems), and proximity in the NS norm definition of security, (Eq.
(2)), the value of l.h.s. of (176) does not depend on the choice of z. Since eavesdropper can chose its input adaptively,
we can assume z is a function of x and y, as a best choice of eavesdropper.
∀η>0∀N>N0∀x,y∀q:X×Y 7→Z∀x,yPη
log dimA
(
x,yPηN ◦MF⊗Nx,y ⊗MG⊗Nz=q(x,y)
(E(P )⊗N (ABE|XY Z)))
N
≤ S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=q(x,y))E(P )(ABE|XY Z). (177)
Remark 7. For simplicity of the presentation of the proof, we restrict to the case in which each copy is subjected to
the same measurement, as this is the case in all known protocols. Generalization is trivial in this case.
Let us chose x¯N , y¯N so that they maximize l.h.s. of (177) for any fixed N > N0,
∀N>N0
log dimA
(
x¯N ,y¯NPηN ◦MF⊗Nx¯N ,y¯N ⊗MG⊗Nz=q(x¯N ,y¯N )
(E(P )⊗N (ABE|XY Z)))
N
(178)
= max
x,y
log dimA
(
x,yPηN ◦MF⊗Nx,y ⊗MG⊗Nz=q(x,y)
(E(P )⊗N (ABE|XY Z)))
N
. (179)
However, x¯N , y¯N might not be an optimal choice for S(A : B||E):
∀η>0∀N>N0∀q:X×Y 7→Z∀x,yPη
max
x,y
log dimA
(
x,yPηN ◦MF⊗Nx,y ⊗MG⊗Nz=q(x,y)
(E(P )⊗N (ABE|XY Z)))
N
≤ S(A : B||E)(MFx¯N ,y¯N⊗MGz=q(x¯N ,y¯N ))E(P )(ABE|XY Z)
≤ max
x,y
S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=q(x,y))E(P )(ABE|XY Z). (180)
Here, we used E(P )⊗N which is not the complete extension of the N iid copies of the device P, used in the norm. Yet,
due to non-signaling condition, both E(P )⊗N and E (P⊗N) possess the same marginal distribution P⊗NAB|XY , hence
the change from E(P )⊗N to E (P⊗N) on l.h.s. of (180) does not change the value of the expression of l.h.s. From the
Theorem 4 of [42] we know that such an extension exists upon appropriate allowed operation on complete extension
on Eve’s side, i.e.,
(1AB ⊗ ΩE)E
(
P⊗N
)
= E (P )⊗N . (181)
ΩE is a channel which discard some of the inputs of the CE of the tensor product of devices. The value of l.h.s. of
(180) does not depend on the choice of z, in both direct as well as general cases, again due to non-signaling between
AB and E, hence we can switch from classical probability distribution to a cc-d distribution:
∀η>0∀N>N0∀q:X×Y 7→Z∀x,yPη
max
x,y
log dimA
(
x,yPηN ◦MFx,y
⊗NE(P⊗N )(ABE|XY Z)
)
N
≤ max
x,y
S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGq(x,y))E(P )(ABE|XY Z).
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From the definition of Λη protocol, it consists of the optimal measurements on the devices and η-optimal LOPC
protocol Pη adjusted with the measurement choices. Recalling that q was and arbitrary function describing Eve’s
action,
∀η>0∀N>N0
log dimA
(
ΛηNE(P⊗N )(ABE|XY Z)
)
N
≤ max
x,y
min
z
S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) (182)
In asymptotic limit
∀η>0 lim sup
N→∞
log dimA
(
ΛηNE(P⊗N )(ABE|XY Z)
)
N
≤ max
x,y
min
z
S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z). (183)
Therefore,
∀η>0 max
x,y
min
z
S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ K
(iid)
DI (P )− η. (184)
By taking a limit for optimal protocol η → 0,
max
x,y
min
z
S(A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ K
(iid)
DI (P ) . (185)
For the second part of the proof, we need to recall some properties of a family of secrecy monotones {M (A : B||E)}
for SKA model [67]. Each function that upper bounds secret key rate in SKA paradigm can be squashed according
to the following procedure. For any fixed one among them,
∀P (ABE) M (A : B||E)P(ABE) ≥ S (A : B||E)P(ABE) . (186)
Extending the above inequality to any tripartite non-signaling device P (ABE|XY Z), one can rewrite
∀P(ABE|XY Z)∀x,y,z M (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) ≥ S (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) . (187)
Without the loss of generality, we fix the device P(ABE|XY Z). Let us denote z¯(x, y) as such an adaptive choice of
z that
∀x,y M (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz¯(x,y))P(ABE|XY Z) := minz M (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) . (188)
The immediate consequence is
∀x,y min
z
M (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) = M (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz¯(x,y))P(ABE|XY Z) (189)
≥ S (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz¯(x,y))P(ABE|XY Z) ≥ minz S (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) . (190)
Employing similar technique again, let us choose x¯, y¯ as
min
z
S (A : B||E)(MFx¯,y¯⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) := maxx,y minz S (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) . (191)
This yields
max
x,y
min
z
S (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) = minz S (A : B||E)(MFx¯,y¯⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) (192)
≤ min
z
M (A : B||E)(MFx¯,y¯⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) ≤ maxx,y minz M (A : B||E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z) . (193)
On the r.h.s. we recognize M̂ (A : B||E)P(ABE|XY Z) from Definition 2. Using the result from the first part of the
proof in (185) with CE as a tripartite device, we obtain:
∀P(AB|XY ) M̂ (A : B||E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ K(iid)DI (P (AB|XY )) . (194)
Remark 8. Notice that, for the measure M̂(A : B||E), the subsystem held by the eavesdropper can be a trivial one,
and, for that scenario, we can use the mutual information function for constructing the upper bound.
uunionsq
35
VII. PROOF OF THE PROPERTIES OF NON-SIGNALING SQUASHED NON-LOCALITY
In this section, we give the proofs of the properties of the non-signaling squashed non-locality. Before we start with
the proof, let’s recall the definition of intrinsic information I (A : B ↓ E), given in Sec. X. This function involves an
optimization over all possible conditional probability distribution ΘE′|E . Moreover, in the squashing procedure an
optimization over the measurements on the CE of a bipartite device P (AB|XY ) have been involved. The non-signaling
squashed intrinsic information is
Î (A : B ↓ E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) = maxx,y minz I (A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) (195)
= max
x,y
min
z
inf
ΘE′|E
I(A : B|E′)(ΘE′|E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z), (196)
where MFx,y is the direct measurement on the inputs X and Y , and MGz is a general measurement on Z. According
to Theorem 4 of [42], (ΘE′|E)(1 ⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) =
∑
e ΘE′|E=e
∑
z p(z|z′)E(P )(ABE = e|XY Z = z) =
P˜ (ABE′|XY Z ′ = z′), is an arbitrary ensemble (even mixed) of the device P (AB|XY ), where 1 is the identity operator
in part of the extending system. Hence, for a fixed input randomizer (dice p(z|z′)) and a fixed channel, one can have
an arbitrary extension P˜ (ABE′|XY ) with unary input. All possible choices of input randomizer and post-processing
channel lead to all possible extensions. So, minz infΘE′|E := inf P˜ (ABE′|XY ).
Let us recall the definition of non-signaling squashed non-locality, which is given by
Nsq(P (AB|XY )) = max
x,y
inf
P˜ (ABE|XY )
I(A : B|E)MFx,yP˜ (ABE|XY ). (197)
This arbitrary extension of a form P˜ (ABE|XY ) gives rise to an arbitrary but fix ensemble of the bipartite device
P (AB|XY ) = ∑e P˜ (ABE = e|XY ) = ∑e p(e)P e(AB|XY ), where P e(AB|XY ) is an arbitrary device corresponding
to each output E = e, and belongs to the same polytope as P . Moreover, all possible choices of P˜ (ABE|XY ) give
rise to in all possible choices of ensembles of P (AB|XY ). The set of all ensembles of a given device P , reads
Sall :=
{
{pi, P i(AB|XY )} :
∑
i
piP
i(AB|XY ) = P
}
. (198)
Hence, inf P˜ (ABE′|XY ) := inf{pi,P i(AB|XY )}∈Sall , and using Eq. (197) we can rewrite the definition of non-signaling
squashed non-locality as
Nsq(P (AB|XY )) = max
x,y
inf
{pi,P i(AB|XY )}∈Sall
∑
i
piI(A : B)MFx,yP i(AB|XY ). (199)
From Eq. (199), it is clear that the non-signaling squashed non-locality reduces to the convex roof extension of the
mutual information function. This is analogous to what happens with the entanglement measure for a mixed state
[58], the only difference is that here we are not only decomposing the device in terms of the pure (extremal) devices,
but we also allow the mixed device decomposition.
A. Positivity of the measure
Corollary 4. The non-signaling squashed non-locality is a positive semidefinite function of bipartite non-signaling
devices P (AB|XY ),
Nsq(P (AB|XY )) ≥ 0, (200)
and the equality holds iff the device P admits a local hidden variable model [8].
Proof. The intrinsic conditional mutual information satisfy I(A : B ↓ E) ≥ 0 for all distributions P (ABE), hence the
positive semi-definiteness directly follows from Eq. (195):
Nsq(P (AB|XY )) = max
x,y
min
z
I (A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ maxx,y minz 0 = 0. (201)
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Now we have to show that it is zero for local devices. Let us assume PL(AB|XY ) is a local device, i.e. there
exists a hidden variable model λ, such that PL(AB|XY ) =
∑
λ P (A|X,λ)⊗P (B|Y, λ)ρ(λ). This leads to an ensemble{ρ(λ), P (A|X,λ) ⊗ P (B|Y, λ)} whose members are tensor products of local devices, hence from Eq. (199), we can
directly write
Nsq(PL(AB|XY )) = max
x,y
∑
i
ρ(λi)I(A : B)MFx,y
(
P (A|X,λi)⊗P (B|Y,λi)
) = 0. (202)
uunionsq
B. Convexity
Proposition 3. Nsq(P ) is a convex function, i.e., if P (AB|XY ) and Q(AB|XY ) are two bipartite non-signaling
devices lying in the same polytope, then
Nsq (λP (AB|XY ) + (1− λ)Q(AB|XY )) ≤ λ Nsq(P (AB|XY )) + (1− λ) Nsq(Q(AB|XY )) (203)
∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Consider the convex combination of the devices
P¯ (AB|XY ) = λP (AB|XY ) + (1− λ)Q(AB|XY ). (204)
Assume an extension P¯ext(ABEΛ|XY ) of P¯ (AB|XY ), such that
P¯ext(ABEΛ = 0|XY ) = p(Λ = 0)P˜ (ABE|XY ), (205)
P¯ext(ABEΛ = 1|XY ) = p(Λ = 1)Q˜(ABE|XY ), (206)
with p(Λ = 0) = λ and p(Λ = 1) = 1 − λ. We consider that the devices P˜ (ABE|XY ) and Q˜(ABE|XY ) are the
arbitrary extensions of the devices P (AB|XY ) and Q(AB|XY ), respectively, as discussed above.
Hence, from Eq. (197), ∀x, y
inf
P¯ext(ABE|XY )
I(A : B|E)MFx,yP¯ext(ABE|XY ) ≤ I(A : B|EΛ)MFx,yP¯ext(ABEΛ|XY ) (207)
= λ I(A : B|E)MFx,yP˜ (ABE|XY ) + (1− λ) I(A : B|E)MFx,yQ˜(ABE|XY ). (208)
The above relation holds for an arbitrary extensions of P and Q, the P˜ (ABE|XY ) and Q˜(ABE|XY ) respectively.
Hence, for the optimal extensions
inf
P(ABE|XY )
I(A : B|E)MFx,yP˜(ABE|XY )
≤ λ inf
P˜ (ABE|XY )
I(A : B|E)MFx,yP˜ (ABE|XY ) + (1− λ) infQ˜(ABE|XY ) I(A : B|E)MFx,yQ˜(ABE|XY ). (209)
Consider the optimal direct measurements for Nsq(P¯ (AB|XY )), as given in Eq. (197), to be x = x¯ and y = y¯.
Nsq(P¯ (AB|XY )) = max
x,y
inf
P¯ext(ABE|XY )
I(A : B|E)MFx,yP˜(ABE|XY ) (210)
= inf
P¯ext(ABE|XY )
I(A : B|E)MFx¯,y¯P¯ext(ABE|XY ) (211)
(I)
≤ λ inf
P¯ext(ABE|XY )
I(A : B|E)MFx¯,y¯P˜ (ABE|XY ) + (1− λ) infQ˜(ABE|XY ) I(A : B|E)MFx¯,y¯Q˜(ABE|XY ). (212)
(II)
≤ λ Nsq(P (AB|XY )) + (1− λ) Nsq(Q(AB|XY )), (213)
where in (I), we use (209), with the optimal full direct measurement in the l.h.s. and in (II), we use the fact that
direct measurements x¯ and y¯, may not be the optimal for Nsq(P (AB|XY )) and Nsq(Q(AB|XY )). uunionsq
37ba
x y
A     B 
ba
x y z
e
A     B     E
x'
ba
x y
a' b'
Dice 𝐷𝐿
Ω𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶
PC
A     B 
PC
y'
≡≡
y'x'
a' b'
A' B'
y'x'
a' b' e
A' B’    E
z
Extension
Complete
Ω𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶(𝑃(𝐴𝐵|𝑋𝑌))
𝑃′(𝐴′𝐵′|𝑋′𝑌′) (𝑃′)(𝐴′𝐵′𝐸|𝑋′𝑌′𝑍)
FIG. 4: Schematic diagram of the ΩLOPC operation, where the inputs of the devices shared by the honest parties are chosen
by a local randomizer DL(xy|x′y′) as given in Eq. (216). Similarly, the outputs are also connected through a post-processing
channel PCL(a′b′|abxy) which also depends on the inputs x, y and has a local hidden variable model given in Eq. (217).
C. Monotonicity under MDLOPC class of operation
Proposition 4. 9 The non-signaling squashed non-locality of any non-signaling bipartite device P satisfies
∀ΩMDLOPC Nsq (ΩLOPC(P )) ≤ Nsq(P ), (214)
∀ΛMDLOPC Nsq (ΛMDLOPC(P )) ≤ Nsq(P ), (215)
where ΩLOPC includes all the class of operations by the honest parties, involves general measurements on the input
and LOPC operations on the output, while ΛMDLOPC ⊂ ΩLOPC is an arbitrary MDLOPC operation, with an adequate
domain.
Proof. We are going to prove that the non-signaling squashed non-locality Nsq(P ), defined in Eq. (199), of any
bipartite non-signaling device P := P (AB|XY ), shared between the honest parties Alice and Bob, where the random
variables X and Y correspond respectively, to the set of inputs and random variables A and B for the set of outputs
for Alice and Bob, is monotonic under the LOPC operations. The set of operations which determines the LOPC
operations, as discussed in Sec. II, consists of a local random choices of the inputs followed by the classical post-
processing of the output variables.
Suppose, that the non-signaling device P (AB|XY ), shared by Alice and Bob and the eavesdropper, Eve holds the
additional interface of the complete extension of P (AB|XY )→ E(P )(ABE|XY Z). By using local randomness in her
part (the input and output) Eve is able to access all possible ensembles {pi, P i(AB|XY )} ∈ Sall(P ),
∑
i piP
i = P .
In the LOPC operation, the honest parties can choose their inputs x and y according to some conditional probability
distribution, which can be the output of some local conditional devices, say DLXY |X′Y ′(xy|x′y′) (as depicted in Fig.
4). The cardinality of outputs of this device |x| and |y| are the same as of the inputs of P (AB|XY ). Moreover,
DLXY |X′Y ′(xy|x′y′) =
∑
λ1
µ(λ1)D
1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1), (216)
where λ1 ∈ Λ1 is the local hidden variable and
∑
λ1
µ(λ1) = 1. This means that the honest parties have access
to a shared randomness µ(λ1), depending on which each of them can roll some individual dice to choose the input.
Similarly, the output is passed through a local post-processing channel PCLA′B′|ABXY (a
′b′|abxy), which also depends
on the inputs of the initial device, as shown in Fig. 4. Additionally,
PCLA′B′|ABXY (a
′b′|abxy) =
∑
λ2
ν(λ2)PC
1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2), (217)
9 The result of this section is partially based on Ref. [38]
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with λ2 ∈ Λ2 and
∑
λ2
ν(λ2) = 1. Hence, the initial device P (AB|XY ) transforms to P ′(A′B′|X ′Y ′) =
ΩLOPC(P (AB|XY )), with
P ′A′B′|X′Y ′(a
′b′|x′y′) =
∑
xy
DLXY |X′Y ′(xy|x′y′)
∑
ab
PAB|XY (ab|xy)PCLA′B′|ABXY (a′b′|abxy) (218)
=
∑
xy
∑
λ1
µ(λ1)D
1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)
∑
ab
P (ab|xy)
×
∑
λ2
ν(λ2)PC
1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2). (219)
The non-signaling squashed non-locality Nsq of the output device P ′ reads
Nsq(P ′) = Î (A′ : B′ ↓ E)E(P′)(A′B′E|X′Y′Z) , (220)
= max
x′y′
inf
{pi,P ′i}∈Sall(P ′)
∑
i
piI(A
′ : B′)P ′i , (221)
where E (P ′) (A′B′E|X ′Y ′Z), is the CE of the output device P ′(A′B′|X ′Y ′) = ΩxyLOPC(PAB|XY ), and Sall(P ′) denotes
all possible ensembles of P ′.
Consider the following tripartite device
ΩLOPC ⊗ 1E (E(P )(ABE|XY Z)) =
∑
xy
DLXY |X′Y ′(xy|x′y′)
∑
ab
E(P )(abe|xyz)PCLA′B′|ABXY (a′b′|abxy) (222)
=
∑
xy
∑
λ1
µ(λ1)D
1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)
∑
ab
E(P )(abe|xyz)
×
∑
λ2
ν(λ2)PC
1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2). (223)
Here 1E means the identity operator in Eve’s subsystem. Recall that E(P ) is the CE of the initial device P .
Consider an ensemble
{
p(e|z)µ(λ1)ν(λ2), P ezλ1λ2(a′b′|x′y′)
}
, where
P ezλ1λ2(a′b′|x′y′) =
∑
xy
D1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)
∑
ab
P ez(ab|xy)PC1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2). (224)
The above ensemble will be an ensemble of P ′(A′B′|X ′Y ′) if {p(e|z), P ezAB|XY } is an ensemble of P (AB|XY ), which
we check below. Moreover, {p(e|z), P ezAB|XY } can be an arbitrary ensemble, and this is realized by Eve by performing
any general measurement and post-processing channel on the CE E(P )(ABE|XY Z):
∑
eλ1λ2
p(e|z)µ(λ1)ν(λ2)P ezλ1λ2(a′b′|x′y′) (225)
=
∑
eλ1λ2
p(e|z)µ(λ1)ν(λ2)
∑
xy
D1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)
∑
ab
P ez(ab|xy)PC1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2) (226)
=
∑
xy
∑
λ1
µ(λ1)D
1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)
∑
ab
(∑
e
p(e|z)P ez(ab|xy)
)∑
λ2
ν(λ2)PC
1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2) (227)
=
∑
xy
∑
λ1
µ(λ1)D
1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)
∑
ab
P (ab|xy)
∑
λ2
ν(λ2)PC
1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2) (228)
= P ′A′B′|X′Y ′(a
′b′|x′y′), (229)
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by using Eq. (219). Because
{
p(e|z)µ(λ1)ν(λ2), P ezλ1λ2(a′b′|x′y′)
}
is an ensemble of P ′,
∀x′,y′ inf{pi,P i}∈Sall(P ′)
∑
i
piI(A
′ : B′)P ′i ≤
∑
eλ1λ2
p(e|z)µ(λ1)ν(λ2)I(A′ : B′)P ezλ1λ2 (A′B′|X′=x′,Y ′=y′) (230)
(I)
≤
∑
eλ1λ2
p(e|z)µ(λ1)ν(λ2)I(AX : BY )P ezλ1λ2 (AXBY |X′=x′,Y ′=y′) (231)
(II)
=
∑
eλ1
p(e|z)µ(λ1) (I(A : B|XY ) + I(X : B|Y ) + I(A : Y |X) + I(X : Y ))P ezλ1 (AXBY |X′=x′,Y ′=y′)(232)
(III)
=
∑
eλ1
p(e|z)µ(λ1)I(A : B|XY )P ezλ1 (AXBY |X′=x′,Y ′=y′) (233)
=
∑
exyλ1
p(e|z)µ(λ1)D1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)I(A : B)P ezλ1 (AB|X=x,Y=y,X′=x′,Y ′=y′) (234)
(IV )
≤ max
xy
∑
e
p(e|z)I(A : B)P ez(AB|XY ), (235)
where in (I) we use the data processing inequality and also use the fact that the distribution P ezλ1λ2AXBY |X′Y ′(axby|x′y′) =
D1(x|x′λ1)D2(y|y′λ1)P ezAB|XY (ab|xy)
∑
a′b′ PC
1(a′|axλ2)PC2(b′|byλ2) is independent of λ2. The chain rule of mutual
information has been used in (II) whereas in (III), we use the fact that given x′, y′ and λ1, the random variables X
and Y are independent, hence I(X : B|Y ) = I(A : Y |X) = 0, follows from the non-signaling condition. In (IV) we
simply write P ezλ1(AB|X = x, Y = y,X ′ = x′, Y ′ = y′) = P ez(AB|X = x, Y = y).
The r.h.s. of (235) is valid for an arbitrary ensemble {p(e|z), P ez} ∈ Sall(P ), so it is still valid when taking infimum
over all ensembles. Hence,
max
x′y′
inf
{pi,P ′i}∈Sall(P ′)
∑
i
piI(A
′ : B′)P ′i(A′B′|X′Y ′) ≤ max
xy
inf
{pi,P i}∈Sall(P )
∑
i
piI(A : B)P i(AB|XY ), (236)
⇒ Nsq (ΩxyLOPC(P )) ≤ Nsq(P ). (237)
The restricted local operation and public communications satisfy ΛMDLOPC ⊂ ΩxyMDLOPC , so
Nsq (ΛMDLOPC(P )) ≤ Nsq(P ). (238)
The above monotonicity property holds also for the non-signaling squashed conditional mutual information Î(A :
B|E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z). uunionsq
D. Superadditivity and additivity
Proposition 5. 10 If two bipartite non-signaling devices P (A1B1|X1Y1) and Q(A2B2|X2Y2) are the marginals of
a four partite non-signaling device P¯ (A1A2B1B2|X1X2Y1Y2), then the non-signaling squashed non-locality Nsq is
superadditive,
Nsq(P¯ (A1A2B1B2|X1X2Y1Y2)) ≥ Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)) +Nsq(Q(A2B2|X2Y2)), (239)
and additive for tensor product of devices P (A1B1|X1Y1)⊗Q(A2B2|X2Y2),
Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)⊗Q(A2B2|X2Y2)) = Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)) +Nsq(Q(A2B2|X2Y2)). (240)
Proof. Superadditivity of joint device: Let us consider two devices P (A1B1|X1Y1) and Q(A2B2|X2Y2), which are
the marginals of a big four party non-signaling device P¯ (A1A2B1B2|X1X2Y1Y2),∑
a2b2
P¯ (a1, a2, b1, b2|x1, x2, y1, y2) = P (a1, b1|x1, y1) ∀a1, b1, x1, x2, y1, y2, (241)∑
a1b1
P¯ (a1, a2, b1, b2|x1, x2, y1, y2) = Q(a2, b2|x2, y2), ∀a2, b2, x1, x2, y1, y2. (242)
10 The result of this section is partially based on Ref. [38].
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where P¯ (A1 = a1, A2 = a2, B1 = b1, B2 = b2|X1 = x1, X2 = x2, Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2) ≡ P¯ (a1, a2, b1, b2|x1, x2, y1, y2),
P (A1 = a1, B1 = b1|X1 = x1, Y1 = y1) = P (a1, b1|x1, y1) and Q(A2 = a2, B2 = b2|X2 = x2, Y2 = y2) =
Q(a2, b2|x2, y2). Moreover, P¯ (A1A2B1B2|X1X2Y1Y2) is also satisfy non-signaling conditions among all of its par-
ties, as defined in Eqs. (18) and (19).
Consider an arbitrary non-signaling extension of P¯ (A1A2B1B2|X1X2Y1Y2) → P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2Z), with
unary input |Z| in the extended part. The input is unary, so the non-signaling condition is automatic and we can omit
the Z. The conditional mutual information of the distribution after performing an arbitrary direct measurements,
i.e., MFx1,y1 ⊗MFx2,y2 on the inputs X1, Y1 and X2, Y2 reads
∀x1, x2, y1, y2
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) (243)
(I)
= (I(A1 : B1|E) + I(A2 : B1|EA1) + I(A1 : B2|EB1) + I(A2 : B2|EA1B1))(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
(II)
≥ I(A1 : B1|E)MFx1,y1 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1) + I(A2 : B2|EA1B1)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2), (244)
where we use the chain rule of mutual information in (I) and in (II), we use positivity condition of mutual information.
MFx1,y1 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1) is the marginals of the device (MFx1,y1 ⊗MFx2,y2)P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) after the direct
measurements on the inputs. Recall that
(MFx1,y1 ⊗MFx2,y2)P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) = P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1 = x1, X2 = x2, Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2). (245)
Noticing that P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1) is an arbitrary extension of P (A1B1|X1Y1) and similarly P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
is for the device Q(A1B1E|X1Y1), we can write
∀x1, x2, y1, y2
I(A1 : B1|E)MFx1,y1 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1) ≥ infP¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1) I(A1 : B1|E)MFx1,y1 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1), (246)
I(A2 : B2|EA1B1)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) ≥ infQ¯(A2B2E|X2Y2) I(A2 : B2|E)MFx2,y2 Q¯(A2B2E|X2Y2). (247)
From relations (244), (246) and (247), we have
∀x1, x2, y1, y2
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
≥ inf
P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E)MFx1,y1 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1) + infQ¯(A2B2E|X2Y2) I(A2 : B2|E)MFx2,y2 Q¯(A2B2E|X2Y2). (248)
The above inequality holds for all extensions of P¯ (A1A2B1B2|X1X2Y1Y2), hence also for an optimal extension on the
l.h.s., so
∀x1, x2, y1, y2
inf
P¯ (A1B1A2B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
≥ inf
P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E)MFx1,y1 P˜ (A1B1E|X1Y1) + infQ¯(A2B2E|X2Y2) I(A2 : B2|E)MFx2,y2 Q¯(A2B2E|X2Y2). (249)
Suppose that x¯1, y¯1 are the optimal direct measurement choice for Nsq(P ) and x¯2, y¯2 are for Nsq(Q),
Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)) = max
x1,y1
inf
P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E)MFx1,y1 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1)
= inf
P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E)MFx¯1,y¯1 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1), (250)
Nsq(Q(A2B2|X2Y2)) = max
x2,y2
inf
P¯ (A2B2E|X2Y2)
I(A2 : B2|E)MFx2,y2 Q¯(A2B2E|X2Y2)
= inf
Q¯(A2B2E|X2Y2)
I(A2 : B2|E)MFx¯2,y¯2 P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1). (251)
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Finally,
Nsq(P¯ (A1B1A2B2|X1X2Y1Y2))
= max
x1,y1,x2y2
inf
P¯ (A1B1A2B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) (252)
(I)
≥ inf
P¯ (A1B1A2B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx¯1,y¯1⊗MFx¯2,y¯2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) (253)
(II)
≥ inf
P¯ (A1B1E|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E)MFx¯1,y¯1 P˜ (A1B1E|X1Y1) + infQ¯(A2B2E|X2Y2) I(A2 : B2|E)MFx¯2,y¯2 Q¯(A2B2E|X2Y2), (254)
(III)
= Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)) +Nsq(Q(A2B2|X2Y2)). (255)
In (I), we use an specific choice of direct measurement, MFx¯1,y¯1 ⊗ MFx¯2,y¯2 , which may not be optimal for device
P¯ (A1B1A2B2|X1X2Y1Y2). We use Eq. (249) for the direct measurements MFx¯1,y¯1 ⊗MFx¯2,y¯2 in (II) and finally in
(III), Eqs. (250) and (251) has been used.
Additivity for tensor product of devices: Let us assume that the joint non-signaling four party device (two
random variables for input and output in the honest parties’ part) is the tensor product [45] of two bipartite devices,
P¯ (A1B1A2B2|X1X2Y1Y2) = P (A1B1|X1Y1)⊗Q(A2B2|X2Y2) (256)
Consider the (non-signaling) extensions with unary inputs of both the devices, P (A1B1|X1Y1) → P¯ (A1B1E1|X1Y1)
and Q(A2B2|X2Y2)→ Q¯(A2B2E2|X2Y2), which are the optimal extensions for calculating Nsq for both the devices, as
given in Eq. (197), for all x and y. Hence, their tensor product P¯ (A1B1E1|X1Y1)⊗ Q¯(A2B2E2|X2Y2) is an extension
of P¯ (A1B1A2B2|X1X2Y1Y2), which may not be optimal one, resulting in
∀x1, x2, y1, y2
inf
P¯ (A1B1A2B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
≤ I(A1A2 : B1B2|E1E2)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1B1E1|X1Y1)⊗Q¯(A2B2E2|X2Y2) (257)
= I(A1 : B1|E1)MFx1,y1 P¯ (A1B1E1|X1Y1) + I(A2 : B2|E2)MFx2,y2 Q¯(A2B2E2|X2Y2) (258)
= inf
P (A1B1E1|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E1)MFx1,y1P (A1B1E1|X1Y1) + infQ(A2B2E2|X2Y2) I(A2 : B2|E2)MFx2,y2Q(A2B2E2|X2Y2) (259)
Considering the optimal direct measurements MFx¯1,y¯1 ⊗MFx¯2,y¯2 in the l.h.s. of the above relation, gives
Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)⊗Q(A2B2|X2Y2))
= max
x1,x2,y1,y2
inf
P¯ (A1B1A2B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx1,y1⊗MFx2,y2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) (260)
= inf
P¯ (A1B1A2B2E|X1X2Y1Y2)
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E)(MFx¯1,y¯1⊗MFx¯2,y¯2 )P¯ (A1A2B1B2E|X1X2Y1Y2) (261)
≤ inf
P (A1B1E1|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E1)MFx¯1,y¯1P (A1B1E1|X1Y1) + infQ(A2B2E2|X2Y2) I(A2 : B2|E2)MFx¯2,y¯2Q(A2B2E2|X2Y2) (262)
≤ max
x1,y1
inf
P (A1B1E1|X1Y1)
I(A1 : B1|E1)MFx1,y1P (A1B1E1|X1Y1) + maxx2,y2 infQ(A2B2E2|X2Y2) I(A2 : B2|E2)MFx2,y2Q(A2B2E2|X2Y2)
(263)
= Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)) +Nsq(Q(A2B2|X2Y2)). (264)
Using relation (255), we finish the proof with equality:
Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)⊗Q(A2B2|X2Y2)) = Nsq(P (A1B1|X1Y1)) +Nsq(Q(A2B2|X2Y2)). (265)
uunionsq
E. Asymptotic continuity of the non-signaling squashed non-locality
Proposition 6. If two non-signaling devices P and Q are -close to each other, according to the NS norm, where
 > 0 is arbitrarily small, then their non-signaling squashed non-locality Nsq differed by,
|Nsq(P (AB|XY ))−Nsq(Q(AB|XY ))| ≤ K1 log dAB +O(), (266)
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where dAB is the dimension of the variables AB, it is the cardinality of the random variable A and B. K1 is a
constant, while O() is a function of  independent of dimension dAB, and converging to 0 when → 0.
Proof. The device norm (Eq. (2)) reads
||P ′(ABE|XY Z)−Q′(ABE|XY Z)||NS = supO
1
2
||O(P ′)(ABE)−O(Q′)(ABE)||1, (267)
where O is the class of operations including general measurements, wiring, input-randomness and post-processing. In
the following proof, we only consider the restricted norm, which optimizes only over the measurements M.
||P ′(ABE|XY Z)−Q′(ABE|XY Z)||resNS = supM
1
2
||M(P ′)(ABE)−M(Q′)(ABE)||1, (268)
let M denotes the set of measurements which map a tripartite device to a tripartite probability distribution. This
restricted norm, which we will consider only for the measurement M≡ O˜ ⊂ O, is a lower bound of the NS norm,
||P ′(ABE|XY Z)−Q′(ABE|XY Z)||resNS = sup
O˜⊂O
1
2
||O˜(P ′)(ABE)− O˜(Q′)(ABE)||1 (269)
≤ sup
O
1
2
||O(P ′)(ABE)−O(Q′)(ABE)||1 = ||P ′(ABE|XY Z)−Q′(ABE|XY Z)||NS (270)
With respect to this restricted NS norm we have the following Lemma, which relates the values of a non-signaling
secrecy quantifier evaluated for two nearby devices with their distance in NS device norm.
Lemma 6 (Proximity in non-signaling squashed intrinsic information). The values of the non-signaling squashed
intrinsic information Î(A : B ↓ E) of two tripartite non-signaling devices P ′(ABE|XY Z) and Q′(ABE|XY Z) are
nearby
|̂I(A : B ↓ E)P ′(ABE|XY Z) − Î(A : B ↓ E)Q′(ABE|XY Z)| ≤ K1˜ log dAB +O(˜), (271)
provided ||P ′(ABE|XY Z)−Q′(ABE|XY Z)||resNS = ˜, where K1 and O(˜) are as in Proposition 6.
Proof. If two probability distributions P¯ (ABE) and Q¯(ABE) are ˜-close, i.e., ||P¯ (ABE)− Q¯(ABE)||1 = ˜, then their
intrinsic mutual informations are close by [68],
|I(A : B ↓ E)P¯ (ABE) − I(A : B ↓ E)Q¯(ABE)| ≤ K1 log dAB +O(). (272)
Now, ||P ′(ABE|XY Z)−Q′(ABE|XY Z)||resNS = ˜, implies that
∀M 1
2
||M(P ′)(ABE)−M(Q′)(ABE)||1 ≤ ˜. (273)
From Definition 2, of non-signaling secrecy quantifier of any tripartite device, we need to consider only the direct
measurements in part of first two parties and general measurements in part of the third one, i.e., M≡MFx,y ⊗MGz ,
which gives
∀M |I(A : B ↓ E)M(P ′)(ABE) − I(A : B ↓ E)M(Q′)(ABE)| ≤ K1˜ log dAB +O(˜), (274)
where we have absorbed the factor 2, in the redefinition of the constant K1.
Now recall the definition of non-signaling secrecy quantifier associated to intrinsic mutual information, which is given
in Definition 3, as
Î(A : B ↓ E)P ′(ABE|XY Z) = max
x,y
min
z
I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P(ABE|XY Z), (275)
where (MFx,y ⊗MGz )P ′(ABE|XY Z) =
∑
z′ p(z
′|z)P ′(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z′). In our cryptographic scenario
Eve chooses her input z after getting the information of the measurement choices x and y of the honest parties. So,
expressing optimum z as a function of x, y is consistent, i.e., for some functions f, g : (x, y)→ z, one has
∀x, y min
z
I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P ′(ABE|XY Z) := I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))P ′(ABE|XY Z), (276)
∀x, y min
z
I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )Q′(ABE|XY Z) := I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=g(x,y))Q′(ABE|XY Z). (277)
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Suppose Î(A : B ↓ E)P ′(ABE|XY Z) ≤ Î(A : B ↓ E)Q′(ABE|XY Z), hence for all x, y and z = f(x, y) we have
|I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))P ′(ABE|XY Z) − I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))Q′(ABE|XY Z)| ≤ K1 log dAB +O(), (278)
max
x,y
|I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))P ′(ABE|XY Z) − I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))Q′(ABE|XY Z)| ≤ K1 log dAB +O(). (279)
Furthermore,
max
x,y
|I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))P ′(ABE|XY Z) − I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))Q′(ABE|XY Z)| (280)
(I)
≥ |max
x,y
I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))P ′(ABE|XY Z) −maxx,y I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))Q′(ABE|XY Z))| (281)
(II)
= |̂I(A : B ↓ E)P ′(ABE|XY Z) −max
x,y
I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))Q′(ABE|XY Z)|. (282)
In (I), we have used the fact that for two functions Θ(x) and Φ(x),
Θ(x) ≤ |Θ(x)− Φ(x)|+ Φ(x), (283)
max
x
Θ(x) ≤ max
x
(|Θ(x)− Φ(x)|+ Φ(x)), (284)
≤ max
x
|Θ(x)− Φ(x)|+ max
x
Φ(x), (285)
max
x
Θ(x)−max
x
Φ(x) ≤ max
x
|Θ(x)− Φ(x)|, (286)
and, similarly,
max
x
Φ(x)−max
x
Θ(x) ≤ max
x
|Θ(x)− Φ(x)|, (287)
|max
x
Θ(x)−max
x
Φ(x)| ≤ max
x
|Θ(x)− Φ(x)|. (288)
In (II), we have used Eqs. (275) and (276).
On the other hand,
max
x,y
I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz=f(x,y))P ′(ABE|XY Z) ≥ maxx,y minz I(A : B ↓ E)(MFx,y⊗MGz )P ′(ABE|XY Z) (289)
= Î(A : B ↓ E)Q′(ABE|XY Z). (290)
If one considers the scenario i.e., Î(A : B ↓ E)P ′(ABE|XY Z) ≥ Î(A : B ↓ E)Q′(ABE|XY Z), then the proof is identical
with f replaced by g. Combining Eqs. (279), (282) and (290) we obtain the desired result. uunionsq
Recall that if the tripartite device is the CE of a bipartite one, then the non-signaling secrecy quantifiers are known
as non-signaling squashed secrecy quantifiers. One important feature of non-signaling squashed intrinsic information
is that it remains invariant under the interchange of complete extension to a overcomplete extension.
Corollary 5 (About overcomplete extension). The non-signaling squashed intrinsic mutual information Î(A :
B ↓ E) is invariant under the replacement of complete extension E(P )(ABE|XY Z) by the overcomplete extension
E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z) of any bipartite non-signaling device P (AB|XY ).
Proof. Before we start the proof, we should recall the idea of the complete extension (CE) and overcomplete extension
(OCE) of any bipartite device as given in [42]. An extension P (AB|XY ) → E(P )(ABE|XY Z) will be called CE, if
corresponds to each input Z = z, of the extending party, the device P (AB|XY ), partitioned to a minimal ensemble
{p(e|z), P e(z)(AB|XY )} (see Definition 4). On the other hand, the extension P (AB|XY ) → E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z) will
be called OCE, if corresponds to each input Z = z, of the extending party, the initial device partitioned to pure
members ensembles (PME) which may not be minimal. By Theorem 3 of [42], any PME can be created by applying
local randomness on the input Z (input randomizer) of the extended system. In particular, we want to consider all
possible OCEs, which can access an arbitrary ensembles of the extended devices. Hence as a basic properties of those
OCE they must include the CE. This condition helps us to define an operation Ω˜ on the OCE of the bipartite device,
such that
Ω˜
(E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z)) = E(P )(ABE|XY Z). (291)
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|Z|E(P ) + |Z|E(Q)
<latexit sha1_base64="6Upn27vGn67yNLysj6EU7WaLgKM=">AAACDnicbVC7SgNBFJ2Nrxhfq5Y2gyGQIIZdLbQMPsAy AfPAZFlmJ7PJkNkHM7NC2OwX2PgbljYWitja2NgJ/oa9k0dhEg9cOJxzL/fe44SMCmkYX1pqYXFpeSW9mllb39jc0rd3aiKIOCZVHLCANxwkCKM+qUoqGWmEnCDPYaTu9M6Hfv2WcEED/1r2Q2J5qONTl2IklWTrucHNwI7jFkYMXib5ciGBB3BaqxQSW88 aRWMEOE/MCcmWCj8fhxffD2Vb/2y1Axx5xJeYISGaphFKK0ZcUsxIkmlFgoQI91CHNBX1kUeEFY/eSWBOKW3oBlyVL+FI/TsRI0+IvueoTg/Jrpj1huJ/XjOS7qkVUz+MJPHxeJEbMSgDOMwGtiknWLK+Ighzqm6FuIs4wlIlmFEhmLMvz5PaUdE8LhoVlc YZGCMN9sA+yAMTnIASuAJlUAUY3IFH8AxetHvtSXvV3satKW0yswumoL3/Astknw4=</latexit>
nX
!
 z1(!)q(e|!), V e(AB|XY )
o
<latexit sha1_base64="H5tD/YnU2ahU+Ias6Wi6UKf5aT Q=">AAACL3icbVDLSgMxFM34rPVVdekmWIQWpMyooEutIC4r2Id06pBJb2swmRmTjFDH+SM3/oobEUXc+hem7Sy0eiBwOO cebu7xI86Utu1Xa2p6ZnZuPreQX1xaXlktrK03VBhLCnUa8lC2fKKAswDqmmkOrUgCET6Hpn9zMvSbdyAVC4MLPYigI0g/ YD1GiTaSVzh1q6zvJq6KheeGAvoEu9zEu8RL7j0nLY3F8m0JHjK607hKIC0dVx9al+VRPM17haJdsUfAf4mTkSLKUPMKz24 3pLGAQFNOlGo7dqQ7CZGaUQ5p3o0VRITekD60DQ2IANVJRvemeNsoXdwLpXmBxiP1ZyIhQqmB8M2kIPpaTXpD8T+vHeveY SdhQRRrCOh4US/mWId4WB7uMglU84EhhEpm/orpNZGEalPxsARn8uS/pLFbcfYqu+f7xaP9rI4c2kRbqIQcdICO0BmqoTq i6BE9ozf0bj1ZL9aH9TkenbKyzAb6BevrG4duqKI=</latexit> X
!
 z2(!)q(e|!), V e(AB|XY )
o
<latexit sha1_base64="bIlaYJ4m+04uYfsYiw9AzlB3g3 s=">AAACL3icbVDLSgMxFM34rPVVdekmWIQKUmZqQZe1grhUsLXSqUMmva2hycyYZIQ6zh+58VfciCji1r8wbWfh60DgcM 493NzjR5wpbdsv1tT0zOzcfG4hv7i0vLJaWFtvqjCWFBo05KFs+UQBZwE0NNMcWpEEInwOF/7gaORf3IJULAzO9TCCjiD9 gPUYJdpIXuHYrbO+m7gqFp4bCugT7HIT7xIvufMqaWki7tyU4D6ju82rBNLSYf2+dbkzjqd5r1C0y/YY+C9xMlJEGU69wpP bDWksINCUE6Xajh3pTkKkZpRDmndjBRGhA9KHtqEBEaA6yfjeFG8bpYt7oTQv0Hisfk8kRCg1FL6ZFERfq9/eSPzPa8e6d 9BJWBDFGgI6WdSLOdYhHpWHu0wC1XxoCKGSmb9iek0kodpUPCrB+X3yX9KslJ29cuWsWqxVszpyaBNtoRJy0D6qoRN0ihq Iogf0hF7Rm/VoPVvv1sdkdMrKMhvoB6zPL4kaqKM=</latexit>
nX
!
 z|Z|E(P ) (!)q(e|!), V
e(AB|XY )
o
<latexit sha1_base64="m6hpguccD2jEPLsSf3ZqTFssz+Q=">AAA CQXicbVBBb9MwGHUGjNKxrcCRi0U1KZWmKtkmsePWCYljkWhX1pToi/u1tWYnme0gdW7+2i78A27cuXAAIa5ccNscYNuTLD29977P9ktywbU Jgq/exoOHjzYf157Ut55u7+w2nj3v66xQDHssE5kaJKBR8BR7hhuBg1whyETgeXJ5tvTPP6HSPEvfm3mOIwnTlE84A+OkuDGIOnwa2UgXMo4 yiVOgkXDjY4jtdWwXF4vY2oiBoG9Kv9sqy9Jfx1pXPi4qut//aLH0TzuLwYfWamFZjxvNoB2sQO+SsCJNUqEbN75E44wVElPDBGg9DIPcjCw ow5nAsh4VGnNglzDFoaMpSNQju2qgpHtOGdNJptxJDV2p/05YkFrPZeKSEsxM3/aW4n3esDCT45HlaV4YTNn6okkhqMnosk465gqZEXNHgCn u3krZDBQw40pflhDe/vJd0j9oh4ftg3dHzZOjqo4aeUleEZ+E5DU5IW9Jl/QIIzfkG/lBfnqfve/eL+/3OrrhVTMvyH/w/vwF53uwUA==</l atexit>
nX
!
 ˜z1(!)q(e|!), V e(AB|XY )
o
<latexit sha 1_base64="AwKjpyyxAP0+iI RHZqYidLTwwZU=">AAACN3i cbVDLSsNAFJ34tr6qLt0MFqG ClEQFXfrYuJIK9iFNDZPJbR0 6k8SZiVBj/sqNv+FONy4Uce sfOG2z8HVg4HDOfcw9fsyZ0r b9ZI2NT0xOTc/MFubmFxaXi ssrdRUlkkKNRjySTZ8o4CyEm maaQzOWQITPoeH3jgd+4wakY lF4rvsxtAXphqzDKNFG8oqn 7hHruqmrEuG5kYAuwa5mPIDU 5WZKQDIvvfWcrDwyN6/LcJf TrfplCln58OiuebE5HJMVvGL JrthD4L/EyUkJ5ah6xUc3iG giINSUE6Vajh3rdkqkZpRDVn ATBTGhPdKFlqEhEaDa6fDuDG 8YJcCdSJoXajxUv3ekRCjVF 76pFERfqd/eQPzPayW6s99OW RgnGkI6WtRJONYRHoSIAyaB at43hFDJzF8xvSKSUG2iHoTg /D75L6lvV5ydyvbZbulgN49j Bq2hdVRGDtpDB+gEVVENUXS PntErerMerBfr3foYlY5Zec8 q+gHr8wvNU6xY</latexit>nX
!
 ˜z2(!)q(e|!), V e(AB|XY )
o
<latexit sha 1_base64="kWDj6tTGJP2X6J hS6YipbGqH4ko=">AAACN3i cbVDLSsNAFJ34rPVVdelmsAg VpCRV0KWPjStRsLXS1DCZ3Nb BmSTOTISa5q/c+BvudONCEb f+gdM2C18HBg7n3Mfc48ecKW 3bT9bY+MTk1HRhpjg7N7+wW FpabqgokRTqNOKRbPpEAWch1 DXTHJqxBCJ8Duf+9eHAP78Fq VgUnuleDG1BuiHrMEq0kbzS sXvAum7qqkR4biSgS7CrGQ8g dbmZEpDMS++8WlYZmRs3Fej ndLNxmUJW2T/oNy82hmOyolc q21V7CPyXODkpoxwnXunRDS KaCAg15USplmPHup0SqRnlkB XdREFM6DXpQsvQkAhQ7XR4d4 bXjRLgTiTNCzUeqt87UiKU6 gnfVAqir9RvbyD+57US3dltp yyMEw0hHS3qJBzrCA9CxAGT QDXvGUKoZOavmF4RSag2UQ9C cH6f/Jc0alVnq1o73S7vbedx FNAqWkMV5KAdtIeO0AmqI4r u0TN6RW/Wg/VivVsfo9IxK+9 ZQT9gfX4Bzv+sWQ==</late xit>
nX
!
 ˜z|Z|E(Q) (!)q(e|!), V
e(AB|XY )
o
<latexit sha1_ base64="j1oAg3in6GKWIzlLeiA FzqzyPY4=">AAACSXicbVBNbxMx FPSmfJTwFeDIxSJC2kgo2i2V4Fi KkDi2EkkDcVjeel9Sq/buYnuRgu O/x4UbN/4DFw4gxAkn2QO0jGRpN DPv2Z68lsLYJPkadXYuXb5ydfda 9/qNm7du9+7cHZuq0RxHvJKVnuR gUIoSR1ZYiZNaI6hc4kl+9nztn3 xAbURVvrLLGmcKFqWYCw42SFnvH TsUC+aYaVTGKoULoMwKWaBjMmwp wGfuY+ZWb1aZc4yDpC98fDzw3sf b+OB9jKuWPhq/dejjZ4eryevBZr HvZr1+Mkw2oBdJ2pI+aXGU9b6wo uKNwtJyCcZM06S2MwfaCi7Rd1lj sAZ+BgucBlqCQjNzmyY8fRiUgs4r HU5p6Ub9e8KBMmap8pBUYE/NeW8 t/s+bNnb+dOZEWTcWS769aN5Iai u6rpUWQiO3chkIcC3CWyk/BQ3ch vLXJaTnv3yRjPeG6ePh3vF+/2C/ rWOX3CcPSExS8oQckJfkiIwIJ5/ IN/KD/Iw+R9+jX9HvbbQTtTP3yD /o7PwBbGyzCA==</latexit>
FIG. 5: Schematic diagram of the construction of the overcomplete extension corresponding to the bipartite non-signaling
devices P and Q by using their complete extensions. For each choice of the input z = zi ∈ Z and 1 ≤ i ≤ |Z|E(P ) of the
CE E(P ) of device P (top left panel) we construct an arbitrary but unique pure members ensemble (top right panel) of the
device Q, which we consider as an ensemble resulting from the OCE, E˜(Q)(ABE|XY Z), for the same input z = zi. Similarly,
corresponding to each z = zj ∈ Z of the CE, E(Q) of device Q (bottom left panel) we map an arbitrarily unique pure members
ensemble of P (bottom right panel), which is obtained for pressing the input z = z|Z|E(P )+j of the OCE of P , E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z).
The OCE which do not possess this property will be called the general extensions. From Eq. (199) it follows that
Î(A : B ↓ E)E(ABE|XY Z) = max
x,y
inf
{pi,P i}∈Sall
∑
i
piI(A : B)P i , (292)
where Sall is the set of all possible ensembles of the non-signaling device P (AB|XY ). This is obtained by performing
all possible kind of measurements, direct (deterministic choices of input) and general (probabilistic choice of direct
measurements) on the extending part of the CE of the given device, followed by a post-processing channel.
Now in case of OCEs P → E˜(P ), any direct measurements on the extending party cause an arbitrary PME. Hence,
all possible general measurements result all possible kind of PME. Using a post-processing channel ΘE¯|E on the output
of the extending part now give access to all possible ensembles Sall of P (AB|XY ). Which leads us to write
Î(A : B ↓ E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) = Î(A : B ↓ E)E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z) (293)
uunionsq
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Generation of overcomplete extension
In the earlier section, we have discussed the OCE of some bipartite device P , which produces all possible pure
members ensembles for direct choices of inputs. However, for a given device there are infinitely many pure members
ensembles which can be produced only by an OCE which contains continuous choices of input randomizer (all possible
dices). These go beyond our investigation of a device. Here we will generate only some class of OCEs of devices which
satisfy Eq. (293).
Suppose we have two non-signaling devices, P (AB|XY ) and Q(AB|XY ), which are ˜-close to each other according
to the restricted norm defined in Eq. (268), i.e., ||P − Q||resNS = ˜. We want to construct the OCEs of both devices,
such that their respective dimensions match.
While the devices P (AB|XY ) and Q(AB|XY ) belong to the same polytope, their CEs, E(P )(ABE|XY Z) and
E(Q)(ABE|XY Z) may not lie in the same polytope (see Section IV of [42]). Corresponding to each input z ∈ Z
of the extending party, the device P (AB|XY ) decomposes to the minimal ensemble {p(e|z), V e(z)P (AB|XY )} for
E(P )(ABE|XY Z) and {q(e|z), V e(z)Q (AB|XY )} for E(Q)(ABE|XY Z). Here V e(z)P is the vertex corresponding to
each output e ∈ E for P , when z is pressed. We will write |Z|E(P ) for the cardinality of inputs of the extending party
of the CE of device P , and |E|E(P )(z), for the cardinality of outputs corresponding to each input z ∈ Z. Similarly,
the notation V
e(z)
Q , |Z|E(Q), |E|E(Q)(z) bears the same meaning for the device Q.
|Z|E(P ) and |Z|E(Q) depend on the number of minimal ensembles the device P and Q have, and in general |Z|E(P ) 6=
|Z|E(Q). Similarly, |E|E(P )(z) 6= |E|E(Q)(z), for a generic z, for any particular choice of the inputs. To construct the
restricted norm between the extensions of the two devices, we need to match their dimensions. To formulate these,
we will follow a particular technique which is given below:
• For |E|E(P ) = |E|E(Q): If one considers labeling the output of the extending system by the vertices through
a bijective mapping, e→ V e(AB|XY ), irrespectively of the input z ∈ Z, then we have |E|E(P ) = |E|E(Q) = D,
with D is the total number of vertices.
• For |Z|E˜(P ) = |Z|E˜(Q): Construct an OCE of the device P and Q to E˜(P ) and E˜(Q) respectively, with the
help of their CE, such that the cardinality of the input satisfies |Z|E˜(P ) = |Z|E(P ) + |Z|E(Q) = |Z|E˜(Q).
Corresponding to each z = zi ∈ Z of the E(P ), with 1 ≤ i ≤ |Z|E(P ), choose a probability distribution
{λzi(ω)},
∑
ω λzi(ω) = 1, to mix all the minimal ensembles of Q generated from E(Q), and to create a pure
members ensemble (PME) {∑ω λzi(ω)q(e|ω), V e(AB|XY )}. Consider an OCE E˜(Q)(ABE|XY Z) of Q, such
that the above PME results under the choice of the input zi by the extending party (see the top left and right
panel of Fig. 5).
Similarly, corresponding to each z = zj for E(Q), we construct a PME {
∑
ω λ˜zj (ω)p(e|ω), V e(AB|XY )} with
the help of probability distribution {λ˜zj (ω)},
∑
ω λzj (ω) = 1, which will appear from E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z) for
input z = z|Z|E(P )+j (see the bottom right to left panel). Here 1 ≤ j ≤ |Z|E(Q).
The OCE E˜(Q) is just equivalent to the CE E(Q) for the inputs z = zj and |Z|E(P ) ≤ j ≤ |Z|E(Q) + |Z|E(P ),
and also E(P ) behaves like E˜(P ) for z = zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Z|E(P ) (see Fig. 5).
For the above specified OCE’s of the devices P and Q, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 7. The restricted NS norms of the OCE’s of the two bipartite devices, generated as above, can be made as
close as they are
∀P,Q ∃E˜(P ),E˜(Q) ||E˜(P )− E˜(Q)||resNS = ||P −Q||resNS . (294)
Proof. The restricted class NS norm of the OCEs of the two devices is given by
||E˜(P )− E˜(Q)||resNS = maxM
1
2
||M(E˜(P ))(ABE)−M(E˜(Q))(ABE)||1 (295)
= max
x,y,z
1
2
||E˜(P )(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z)− E˜(Q)(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z)||1, (296)
where we have used the partial results from Proposition 2, with the direct measurement (MFx,y ⊗
MFz )(E˜(P ))(ABE|XY Z) = E˜(P )(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = z). For all x, y and z = zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Z|E(P ), we
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have
||E˜(P )(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = zi)− E˜(Q)(ABE|X = x, Y = y, Z = zi)||1
=
∑
a,b,e
∣∣∣E˜(P )(A = a,B = b, E = e|X = x, Y = y, Z = zi)− E˜(Q)(A = a,B = b, E = e|X = x, Y = y, Z = zi)∣∣∣(297)
=
∑
a,b,e
∣∣∣p(e|zi)V e(A = a,B = b|X = x, Y = y)−∑
ω
λzi(ω)q(e|ω)V e(A = a,B = b|X = x, Y = y)
∣∣∣ (298)
=
∑
a,b,e
∣∣∣p(e|zi)−∑
ω
λzi(ω)q(e|ω)
∣∣∣V e(A = a,B = b|X = x, Y = y) (299)
=
∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|zi)−∑
ω
λzi(ω)q(e|ω)
∣∣∣ (300)
In the procedure of generating the above OCEs E˜(P ) and E˜(Q), the probability distributions {λz(ω)}, for each z,
are the only parameters which can give rise to OCEs, that would be different, yet remaining in the same family. Each
of them is a function of z, so we can first perform the optimization for each {λz(ω)} and then maximize over z for
the restricted class device norm. For any z = zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Z|E(P ), we want to find
min
{λz(ω)}
1
2
∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|z)−∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)
∣∣∣ (301)
Observation 2. For all zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Z|E(P ), the function
∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|z)−∑ω λzi(ω)q(e|ω)∣∣∣ > 0 for all {λz(ω)}.
Proof. We have assumed that the two bipartite devices P and Q, satisfy ||P − Q||resNS = ˜ > 0. If it is not the case,
i.e.,
∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|z)−∑ω λzi(ω)q(e|ω)∣∣∣ = 0, for some choices of {λz(ω)}, then
||P −Q||resNS = max
x,y
∑
ab
1
2
∣∣∣P (A = a,B = b|X = x, Y = y)−Q(A = a,B = b|X = x, Y = y)∣∣∣ (302)
= max
x,y
∑
ab
1
2
∣∣∣∑
e
(
p(e|z)−
∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)
)
V e(A = a,B = b|X = x, Y = y)
∣∣∣, (303)
≤ max
x,y
∑
ab
1
2
∣∣∣∑
e
(
p(e|z)−
∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)
)∣∣∣V e(A = a,B = b|X = x, Y = y), (304)
=
1
2
∣∣∣∑
e
(
p(e|z)−
∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)
)∣∣∣. (305)
Hence, ||P −Q||resNS = 0, which contradicts our assumption of ˜ > 0.
uunionsq
Inequality (305) holds for all z and {λz(ω)}, hence it is clear that ||E˜(P )− E˜(Q)||resNS ≥ ||P −Q||resNS . We will show
that there exists an OCE for which the equality holds.
We search for a minimum of the function
∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|z)−∑ω λz(ω)q(e|ω)∣∣∣ in terms of λz(ω), under the constraints
||P −Q||resNS = ˜, (306)∑
ω
λz(ω) = 1. (307)
Using Lagrange’s undetermined multipliers, we introduce the auxiliary function,
F ({λz(ω)}) =
∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|z)−∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)
∣∣∣+ η(∑
ω
λz(ω)− 1
)
+ ξ
(||P −Q||NS − ) (308)
The optimal choice of {λz(ω)} will be such that satisfies
δF ({λz(ω)}) = 0 ⇒
∑
ω
∂F
∂λz(ω)
δλz(ω) = 0, (309)
∂F
∂λz(ω)
= 0 ∀λz(ω). (310)
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∂
∂λz(ω)
(∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|z)−∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)
∣∣∣) = ∑
e
sgn
(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e|ω′)− p(e|z)
)
q(e|ω), (311)
=
∑
e
sgn
(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e|ω′)− p(e|z)
)
q(e|ω), (312)
where we use
d|x|
dx
:= sgn(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0,
−1 if x < 0. (313)
On the other hand, for calculating ||P −Q||resNS , we assume that the optimal (for the purpose of maximization) choices
of inputs are x = x¯ and y = y¯. Considering Eq. (303), and writing V e(A = a,B = b|X = x¯, Y = y¯) = V e(ab|x¯y¯), we
obtain
∂
∂λz(ω)
||P −Q||resNS =
∂
∂λz(ω)
1
2
∑
ab
∣∣∣∑
e
(
p(e|z)−
∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)
)
V e(ab|x¯y¯)
∣∣∣ (314)
=
1
2
∑
ab
sgn
(∑
e′
V e
′
(ab|x¯y¯)(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e′|ω′)− p(e′|z)))∑
e
q(e|ω)V e(ab|x¯y¯) (315)
=
1
2
∑
e
[∑
ab
sgn
(∑
e′
V e
′
(ab|x¯y¯)(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e′|ω′)− p(e′|z)))V e(ab|x¯y¯)]q(e|ω) (316)
Hence, the optimal λz(ω) should satisfy∑
e
sgn
(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e|ω′)− p(e|z)
)
q(e|ω) + η
+
ξ
2
∑
e
[∑
ab
sgn
(∑
e′
V e
′
(ab|x¯y¯)(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e′|ω′)− p(e′|z)))V e(ab|x¯y¯)]q(e|ω) = 0, (317)
∑
e
[
sgn
(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e|ω′)− p(e|z)
)
+ η
+
ξ
2
∑
ab
sgn
(∑
e′
V e
′
(ab|x¯y¯)(∑
ω′
λz(ω
′)q(e′|ω′)− p(e′|z)))V e(ab|x¯y¯)]q(e|ω) = 0. (318)
Assume that, for each e, {λz(ω)} satisfies
sgn
(∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)− p(e|z)
)
= −η − ξ
2
∑
ab
sgn
(∑
e′
V e
′
(ab|x¯y¯)(∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e
′|ω)− p(e′|z)))V e(ab|x¯y¯). (319)
The above equation does not provide the explicit solution of optimal {λz(ω)}, but its characteristic form is sufficient
for obtaining the optimal value of Eq. (301):
1
2
∑
e
∣∣∣p(e|z)−∑
ω
λzi(ω)q(e|ω)
∣∣∣ = 1
2
∑
e
sgn
(∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)− p(e|z)
)(∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)− p(e|z)
)
(320)
=
1
2
∑
e
[
− η − ξ
2
∑
ab
sgn
(∑
e′
V e
′
(ab|x¯y¯)(∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e
′|ω)− p(e′|z)))V e(ab|x¯y¯)](∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)− p(e|z)
)
(321)
= −ξ
4
∑
ab
sgn
(
Q(ab|x¯y¯)− P (ab|x¯y¯)
)(
Q(ab|x¯y¯)− P (ab|x¯y¯)
)
− η
2
∑
e
(∑
ω
λz(ω)q(e|ω)− p(e|z)
)
(322)
= −ξ
4
∑
ab
∣∣∣Q(ab|x¯y¯)− P (ab|x¯y¯)∣∣∣ = −ξ
2
||P −Q||resNS . (323)
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Here we used Q(ab|x¯y¯) = ∑e∑ω q(e|ω)λz(ω)V e(ab|x¯y¯), P (ab|x¯y¯) = ∑e p(e|z)V e(ab|x¯y¯) and ∑e (∑ω λz(ω)q(e|ω)−
p(e|z)
)
= 1. Moreover, ||E˜(P )−E˜(Q)||resNS and ||P −Q||resNS are positive quantities, so ξ < 0. From ||E˜(P )−E˜(Q)||resNS ≥
||P −Q||resNS , it follows that the infimum value is obtained for ξ = −2.
The r.h.s. of Eq. (323) is independent of z, and due to reverse generation of PME for any zj , with |Z|E(P ) ≤ j ≤
|Z|E(P ) + |Z|E(Q), as depicted in Fig. 5, we can say that the above relation also holds for all z in the OCEs E˜(P ) and
E˜(Q). Hence, corresponding to each P and Q, there exists OCEs E˜(P ) and E˜(Q) of devices P and Q respectively,
such that
||E˜(P )− E˜(Q)||resNS = ||P −Q||resNS . (324)
uunionsq
By using Lemmas 6 and 7 and Corollary 5 we have
|Nsq(P (AB|XY ))−Nsq(Q(AB|XY ))| = |̂I(A : B ↓ E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) − Î(A : B ↓ E)E(Q)(ABE|XY Z)| (325)
= |̂If (A : B ↓ E)E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z) − Îf (A : B ↓ E)E˜(Q)(ABE|XY Z)| (326)
≤ K1||E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z)− E˜(Q)(ABE|XY Z)||resNS log dAB
+O(||E˜(P )(ABE|XY Z)− E˜(Q)(ABE|XY Z)||resNS) (327)
= K1˜ log dAB +O(˜) (328)
≤ K1||P −Q||NS log dAB +O
(||P −Q||NS). (329)
In Corollary 5, we show that Nsq(P ), is invariant over E(P ) to the E˜(P ) of P , when it is constructed according to the
depiction of Fig. 5, and independent over λz(ω). In Lemma 6 we have extended the asymptotic continuity of intrinsic
mutual information of two tripartite probability distribution to the asymptotic continuity of non-signaling secrecy
quantifier (based on intrinsic information) of two tripartite devices. Finally, by Lemma 7, we connect the restricted
norm of two over-complete extensions to the same of that bipartite devices.
uunionsq
F. Subextensivity
Proposition 7. Non-signaling squashed non-locality is bounded by log (min {dA, dB}).
Proof. From the defnintion of non-signaling squashed non-locality given in Eq. (199) we have
Nsq(P (AB|XY )) = max
x,y
inf
{pi,P i(AB|XY )}∈Sall
∑
i
piI(A : B)MFx,yP i(AB|XY ) (330)
(I)
≤ max
x,y
inf
{pi,P i(AB|XY )}∈Sall
∑
i
pi log (min {dxA, dyB}) (331)
≤ log (min {dA, dB}) . (332)
where in (I), we use the fact that I(A : B)Mx,y(P i(AB|XY )) ≤ log (min {dxA, dyB}) for all i, and dxA = suppP (A|X = x)
and dyB = suppP (B|Y = y) and dA = maxx suppP (A|X = x) and dB = maxy suppP (B|Y = y). uunionsq
VIII. NON-LOCALITY COST AS AN UPPER BOUND
Definition 13. The non-locality cost of bipartite non-signaling device is
NC(P ) := C(P ) log (min {dA, dB}) , (333)
where dA = maxx suppMFx (P (A|X)) and dB = maxy(suppMFy (P (B|Y )) are dimensions of the outputs, and C(P ) is
the non-locality fraction of P [69, 70].
Proposition 8. The secret key rate K
(iid)
DI (P ) of a device is upper bounded by
NC(P ) ≥ K(iid)DI (P ), (334)
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Proof. Suppose Alice and Bob share a non-signaling device P ≡ P (AB|XY ), and Eve has access to its complete
extension [42]. The device P can be decomposed into a non-local vertex and a local device,
P = αPVNL + (1− α)PL, (335)
where PVNL is the non-local vertex and PL is any local device. Let us denote the non-locality fraction
C(P ) := min
All decompsitions as in Eq. (335)
α. (336)
Eve can always get access to this ensemble,
{(
C(P ), P¯VNL
)
,
(
1− C(P ), P¯L
)}
, in part of the honest parties.
We assume that Eve works in favor of Alice and Bob, and informs them about her output when she obtains the above
ensemble. The key rate K˜, in this scenario, must be greater than in NSDI-iid scenario, since in the latter case Eve
does not work on account of Alice and Bob,
K
(iid)
DI (P ) ≤ K˜(P ). (337)
With a probability C(P ) the honest parties share the non-local correlations, useful for secret key agreement and with
probability 1−C(P ), they share a local device with zero key rates. Since the key satisfying Maurer’s security definition
is upper bounded by mutual information function, and both of them are non-increasing under the LOPC operations,
we obtain
K˜(P ) ≤ C(P )
(
max
x,y
I(A : B)MFx,yPVNL(AB|XY )
)
. (338)
Furthermore,
I(A : B)MFx,y(P (AB|XY )) ≤ log (min {dxA, d
y
B}) , (339)
where dxA = suppP (A|X = x) and dyB = suppP (B|Y = y). Employing Eq. (337), we finally obtain
K
(iid)
DI (P ) ≤ C(P )
(
sup
MFx,y
log (min {dxA, dyB})
)
(340)
= C(P ) log (min {dA, dB}) = NC(P ), (341)
by Definition 13, with dA = maxx suppP (A|X = x) and dB = maxy suppP (B|Y = y). uunionsq
IX. EXAMPLES OF SECRECY MONOTONES, CONVEXIFICATION OF Î (A : B ↓ E) AND A
NON-TRIVIAL BOUND
Monotones based on mutual information functions are used to upper bound the secret key rate on the SKA scenario.
However, the only one amongst them which is easily computable is the mutual information itself. All of them can be
“squashed” and used to generate the upper bounds for K
(iid)
DI .
Fact 2. The secrecy quantifiers and monotones [34] (and the mutual information function) are the upper bounds on
S (A : B||E):
I (A : B)P (ABE) ≥ S (A : B||E)P (ABE) , (342)
I (A : B|E)P (ABE) ≥ S (A : B||E)P (ABE) , (343)
min
{
I (A : B)P (ABE) , I (A : B|E)P (ABE)
}
≥ S (A : B||E)P (ABE) , (344)
I (A : B ↓ E)P (ABE) ≥ I (A : B ↓↓ E)P (ABE) ≥ S (A : B||E)P (ABE) . (345)
We can use all of the functions displayed in Fact 2 to construct the non-signaling squashed secrecy quantifiers and
monotones for the devices. For the proper definition of the above functions see Sec. X.
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Corollary 6. The following upper bounds on K
(iid)
DI (P) hold
Î (A : B)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ K(iid)DI (P ), (346)
Î (A : B|E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ K(iid)DI (P ), (347)
min
{
Î (A : B)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) , Î (A : B|E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z)
}
≥ K(iid)DI (P ), (348)
Î (A : B ↓ E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ Î (A : B ↓↓ E)E(P )(ABE|XY Z) ≥ K(iid)DI (P ). (349)
The proof of Corollary 6 is straightforward from Theorem 2. By E(P )(ABE|XY Z) we denote the complete extension
of the single copy of a device P (AB|XY ) shared by Alice and Bob to Eve’s system.
The intrinsic information Î (A : B ↓ E) and the reduced intrinsic information Î (A : B ↓↓ E) are functions without
closed-form expression, and hence they cannot be computed straightforwardly. We present a technique for finding a
non-trivial bound using the properties of one of them. First, we notice, that for any fixed bipartite device and its
complete extension the following is true.
Fact 3 (Hierarchy between different mutual information functions).
Nsq(P ) = Î (A : B ↓ E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) ≤ Î (A : B)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) , (350)
Nsq(P ) = Î (A : B ↓ E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) ≤ Î (A : B|E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) , (351)
Nsq(P ) = Î (A : B ↓ E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) ≤ min{̂I (A : B)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) , Î (A : B|E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ)}. (352)
Unfortunately, the non-signaling squashed non-locality lacks a closed form expression for an arbitrary non-signaling
device, as it involves optimization over general measurement and post-processing channels in the eavesdropper side.
This makes it hard to compute in generic case. Although the intrinsic information function is not convex, the non-
signaling squashed non-locality is convex, see Sec. VII B. This may be due to the fact that it was constructed in the
same way as the non-signaling squashed entanglement, and the latter is a convex function of quantum states [39]. In
this Section we will show how convexity of non-signaling squashed non-locality can be used not only to calculate non-
trivial upper bounds on K
(iid)
DI , but also how it can be used to define new non-signaling squashed secrecy quantifiers.
The non-signaling squashed non-locality is upper bounded with non-signaling squashed conditional mutual information
and also with non-signaling squashed mutual information. Hence,
Fact 4. Non-signaling squashed non-locality is upper-bounded by the following expression.
Nsq(P ) ≤ min
{
Î (A : B)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) , Î (A : B|E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ)
}
. (353)
Fact 4, although very simple, brings an idea how to make use of the convexity of non-signaling squashed non-locality.
Since the non-signaling squashed non-locality is an upper bound on it itself, the right hand side of Eq. (353) must
also be an upper bound on K
(iid)
DI , Together with the convexity property, it implies that a lower convex hull of plots
of Î (A : B|E) and Î (A : B) also bounds K(iid)DI from above.
Theorem 4. Within a family of functions {Fi}, which are convex with respect to mixtures of devices, and
Fi(P ) ≤ Î (A : B)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) , (354)
Fi(P ) ≤ Î (A : B|E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) , (355)
there exists a function F that upper bounds any function in {Fi} and for which the following relation holds
F (P ) ≥ K(iid)DI (P). (356)
Proof. Since Î (A : B ↓ E) ∈ {Fi} because of Lemma 3 and Î (A : B ↓ E)E(P) ≥ K(iid)DI (P), then, for a function F which
lies above the plot of intrinsic mutual information, F (P) ≥ K(iid)DI (P). uunionsq
Theorem 4 can be easily generalized by imposing different constraints than Equations (354) and (355) for example
by using another upper bounds on the non-signaling squashed non-locality and also an arbitrary number of them.
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Remark 9. Lower convex hull of plots of arbitrary number of functions, each being an upper bound on a convex
function which upper bounds K
(iid)
DI , is an upper bound on the key rate itself.
This automatically yields a recipe how to construct nontrivial upper bounds on K
(iid)
DI . We come up with the
following Corollary, being a direct consequence of Theorem 4 and Remark 9.
Corollary 7. A non-trivial upper bound is given by the lower convex hull (LCH) of plots of non-signaling squashed
secrecy quantifiers.
Nsq(P ) ≤ F (P ) := LCH
{
Î (A : B)E(P)(ABE|XYZ) , Î (A : B|E)E(P)(ABE|XYZ)
}
(357)
Proof. We prove by contradiction. If there would be a function which at any point is greater than the lower convex
hull of Î (A : B) and Î (A : B |E ), either it would not be convex or it would be greater (at least at a single point) then
at least one from the above non-signaling squashed non-locality quantifiers. Therefore, it is not in the set {Fi}. uunionsq
The upper bound on K
(iid)
DI introduced in Corollary 7 can be computed much more easily than the non-signaling
squashed non-locality. We will refer to the procedure of calculating upper bounds via this technique as convexification.
Fact 3 and Lemma 8 provide a collection of functions which are upper bounds for Nsq. Hence, there exists a convex
(in the same sense) function which is an upper bound on the squashed intrinsic mutual information, but at the same
time it is a lower bound on any function in this group. This leads us to the following proof of Theorem 4.
X. NUMERICAL UPPER BOUNDS ON SQUASHED NON-LOCALITY
In this section, we will provide the upper bound on the Nsq, for some exemplary two binary input and two binary
output device. We have obtained that there exists some devices, that are not MDLOPC key distillble although they
are non-local. Describing the procedure of convexification, we focused on obtaining upper bounds by employing lower
convex hull of the upper bounds on Nsq. The reason behind such an approach is to simplify our calculations. In this
Section, we present a specific example of upper bounds on Nsq, which we have obtained via this technique for some
bipartite binary input output non-local devices. Let us recall here that Nsq is defined as
Nsq(P ) = max
x,y
min
z
inf
ΘE′|E
I(A : B|E′)(MFx,y⊗MGz )E(P ). (358)
The core strategy is based on the observation that the definition of non-signaling squashed non-locality involves two
minimizations, that the measurement and that of a post-processing channel, in part of the eavesdropper. We notice
that one can obtain an upper bounds also in the case in which used measurement and channels are not optimal, which
follows from the property of infimum. Knowing this, we can run a three-step strategy to obtain an upper bound on
K
(iid)
DI for the desired set of devices.
1. Choose an (arbitrary, possibly continuous) set of devices, for which an upper bound is to be calculated.
2. Calculate the values of upper bounds on non-signaling squashed non-locality employing different devices, different
measurement choices and different post-processing channels. These can be obtained either via educated guess,
some heuristic method or with computer aid including a random search over the space.
3. Construct lower convex hull of all previously generated plots, and the result is the convex hull of the chosen set
of points.
We will now employ the above technique to bound the K
(iid)
DI . As we have argued the notion of security employed by
us is equivalent to that used by Ha¨nggi, Renner and Wolf [17]. The protocol proposed by them yields a positive key
rate for devices exhibiting quantum correlations, we compare our upper bounds with the lower bound presented by
them [17, 62], in Fig. 6. The non-signaling device we consider, as in Ref. [17], is given by
PHRW (ab|xy) =
x 0 1
y b
a 0 1 0 1
0
0 12 − δ2 δ2 38 − 2 18 + 2
1 δ2
1
2 − δ2 18 + 2 38 − 2
1
0 38 − 2 18 + 2 18 + 2 38 − 2
1 18 +

2
3
8 − 2 38 − 2 18 + 2
. (359)
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FIG. 6: Plot of several secrecy quantifiers M̂(A : B||E), as an upper bound on secure key rate K(iid)DI , for the bipartite
binary input output device PHRW given in Eq. (359) (also in Ref. [17]). The parameters chosen for drawing these figures
are provided in Table I. The dashed red line corresponds to the non-signaling squashed mutual information Î(A : B)PHRW .
The blue straight line represents the non-locality cost, as well as the non-signaling squashed conditional mutual information
Î(A : B|E)E(PHRW ) over the complete extension E(PHRW ) of the given device P . The solid orange line represents the upper
bound on the non-signaling squashed non-locality Nsq which is in fact the lower convex hull of the several other upper bounds
on Nsq.
It remains a valid non-signaling probability distribution in the parameter range 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and − 14 ≤  ≤ 34 . It
exhibits non-local correlation for a very small range of parameters, which one can quantify by the parameter ε, error
in wining the CHSH game [71], which is
ε = Pr(a⊕ b 6= x · y) = 1
4
(
3
4
+ δ + 3
)
. (360)
The device is non-local when the error ε ∈ [0, 14 ), and there are many such choices of δ and . Without the loss of
generality, we choose 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and − 14 ≤  ≤ 112 − δ3 . The non-locality fraction of these devices in the above range
of parameters is C(P ) = 14 − δ − 3.
The polytope of bipartite binary input output device, where PHRW lies, consists of 24 extremal devices [72], among
which 16 are local or deterministic devices and 8 are non-local. The local devices are given by
Lαβγσ(ab|xy) =
{
1 if a = αx⊕ β, b = γy ⊕ σ
0 otherwise.
(361)
where α, β, γ, σ ∈ {0, 1}. And the non-local devices are
Brst(ab|xy) =
{
1/2 if a⊕ b = xy ⊕ rx⊕ sy ⊕ t
0 otherwise,
(362)
where r, s, t ∈ {0, 1}.
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Fig. δ 
(a) 0.01 1
16
(3.04 + 12ε)
(b) 0.03 1
16
(3.12 + 12ε)
(c) 2
5
ε 6
5
ε− 1
4
(d) ε ε− 1
4
TABLE I: Table of the different values of the parameters δ and , for the sub-figures as given in Fig. 6. δ and  are the
parameters of bipartite non-signaling device PHRW given in Eq. (359).
In Fig. 6, we plot several non-signaling squashed secrecy quantifiers and monotones M̂ (A : B||E) for different
choices of the parameters δ and , with respect to the ε, which forms the upper bound on K
(iid)
DI . Different plots
correspond to different choices of the parameters  and δ, as given in Table I. The last row of Table I, give rise to the
isotropic device, i.e., Piso = (1− ε)PR+ εPR, described in the main text.
In all the four figures, the red dashed line represents the squashed mutual information Î(A : B)P between Alice
and Bob. The optimal choices of the measurements by Alice and Bob in the squashing process varies with δ and .
For Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), the optimum direct measurement choice is (x = 0, y = 0) for δ < ε, and any one of the other
three input choices for δ ≥ ε. The measurement choice (x = 0, y = 0) is optimal in the entire range of ε for Fig. 6(c),
and all measurements choices give the same mutual information for the choice of δ and  in Fig. 6(d).
The non-locality cost NC(PHRW) is plotted with the dashed-dot blue line in all the figures.
Fig. 6(d) clearly shows that our measure, non-signaling squashed non-locality Nsq is not a faithful measure of
non-locality. The orange curve is the upper bound on Nsq and we have found that the bound reaches to 0 for ε = 0.2
(it remains equal 0 for ε ∈ (0.2, 0.25] due to the convexity of the measure). It strongly suggest that there exists
non-locality which can not be turned into security. Indeed, for these devices no protocol of distribution is known.
Using wirings that is necessary for the key to be non-zero, imply that we enter to some extent the general scenario
of KDI for which there is a wide class of attacks [30]. Since our scenario is restricted we can not postulate non
equivalence between non-locality and secrecy in NSDI paradigm.
A. Method to obtain the upper bound on Nsq
The non-signaling squashed non-locality defined in Eq. (358), is the optimal conditional mutual information I(A :
B|E′)E(PHRW), between Alice and Bob, when Eve holds the complete extension of the device PHRW. It involves a
maximization over the measurement (input) choices of Alice and Bob. In our cryptographic protocol, we assume that
Eve will perform adaptive choice of measurements, after learning the measurements of Alice and Bob, followed by a
post-processing channel. We also observed that, an arbitrary adaptive measurement by Eve, direct as well as general,
with any post-processing channel provides an upper bound on Nsq. Which remains convex over ε, in the entire range
of ε.
We calculate numerically the CE [42] of PHRW in the entire range of δ and , where the device is non-local. The most
tighter upper bound we have obtained numerically, involve a direct measurement by Eve. This direct measurement is
no doubt is a function of Alice and Bob’s input choice, which is intended to reduce the correlation shared by them.
This measurement on Eve’s system creates the following minimal ensembles in part of Alice and Bob,
v =
[
1
4
− δ − 3, 1 + 4
8
,
1 + 4
8
,
1 + 4
8
,
1 + 4
8
,
1 + 4
8
,
1 + 4
8
,
δ
2
,
δ
2
]
, (363)
Ez0 = [B000,L0000,L0010,L0101,L0111,L1000,L1101,L1011,L1110]. (364)
The same measurement leads us to the non-signaling squashed conditional mutual information Î(A : B|E)E(P ) for all
input choices of Alice and Bob, which we have plotted by the dashed-dotted blue line in all the figures of Fig. 6. We
have obtained that non-locality cost of the shared device is NC(PHRW) = Î(A : B|E)E(P ).
The classical discrete post-processing channel ΘE′|E , that we have obtained is different for different input choice of
Alice and Bob. And they are
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Θ0,0E′|E =
Device B000 L0000 L0010 L0101 L0111 L1000 L1101 L1011 L1110
e′
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
, (365)
Θ0,1E′|E =
Box B000 L0000 L0010 L0101 L0111 L1000 L1101 L1011 L1110
e′
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
, (366)
Θ1,0E′|E =
Device B000 L0000 L0010 L0101 L0111 L1000 L1101 L1011 L1110
e′
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
, (367)
Θ1,1E′|E =
Device B000 L0000 L0010 L0101 L0111 L1000 L1101 L1011 L1110
e′
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
. (368)
Hence, the upper bound on the key, according to our numerical findings is
K
(iid)
DI ≤ Nsq(P ) ≤ LCH
{
Î (A : B|E)E(PRH)(ABE|XYZ) , Î (A : B|E)Q(ABE|XYZ)
}
, (369)
where Q(ABE|XY Z) = ΘX,YE|E′
(E (PHRW) (ABE′|XY Z)), an arbitrary optimal extension, which is obtained from CE
by applying the above post-processing channel.
The plot of the r.h.s. of Eq. (369) is given by the solid orange curve in Fig. 6. The color shade is given to separate
the two regions where the optimal measurement choices of the honest parties are coming from two different inputs.
The light blue shade in Fig. 6(a) and 6(b) represents the choices of optimal inputs to be (x = 0, y = 0), whereas the
dark blue shade is for the other input choices (all of them give rise to the same value). In Fig. 6(c) the optimal input
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by the honest parties is (x = 0, y = 0), and in Fig. 6(d) all the choices of inputs are equally likely, so we choose the
color shed to be light blue.
We compare our upper bound with the key rate R (PHRW|P ), generated by Ha¨nggi, Renner and Wolf [17], which
is the magenta dotted line in all the figures in Fig. 6. It lies below the solid orange line, as it represents the NSDI
key rate for a particular protocol, and we provide the upper bound over all possible protocols.
Moreover, if we compare the bounds of the different figures of Fig. 6, we observe that for a fixed value of the error
ε of the CHSH game, the bound is almost decreasing if one moves from Fig. 6(a) to 6(d). This is due to the fact
that, in Fig. 6(a), the choices of the parameters δ and  are such that the error in winning probability for the CHSH
game is smaller for one choice of input by the honest parties than the other, and they can choose those by direct
measurement. In Fig. 6(d) all the distribution has the same error ε, depicting the lowest bound, i.e., all the inputs
give rise to the same error, which leads to no specific choice of inputs.
The non-faithfulness of our measure is clearly visible from Fig. 6(d). We have found that the bound reaches to
0 for ε = 0.2 (it remains equal 0 for ε ∈ (0.2, 0.25] due to the convexity of the measure). It strongly suggest that
there exists non-locality which can not be turned into security. Indeed, for these devices no protocol of distribution
is known. Using wirings that is necessary for the key to be non-zero, imply that we enter to some extent the general
scenario of KDI for which there is a wide class of attacks [30].
